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PREFACE
This report is a product of the New England Regional Commission's Energy 
Research and Policy Formulation Program. The Energy Program will have several 
major outputs including:
-Supply/demand data and projections for New England's energy requirements 
to 1990.
-Effects on New England from petroleum related industrial development 
(including OCS development).
-New England gas industry development study.
-A review of electric power demand and supply trends and forecasts.
-Impacts of recent energy shortages and price increases on New England. 
-Guidelines and a handbook for power plant siting.
-Legal and Institutional project, including a compendium and analysis 
of energy facility related statutes, and an energy policy and decision­
making study. . .
-The New England Fishing Industry and the projected impacts of Outer 
Continental Shelf development.
-Analysis and Regulatory Implications of the New England Power Pool.
A complete list of Energy Program publications is available from the Commission's 
Energy Program Director.
The goal of the Energy Program is to supply the members of the New England Regional 
Commission, which is comprised of the six New England Governors and a Federal 
Cochairman appointed by the President, with reliable baseline information on New 
England's energy requirements and vulnerability, and to provide the Governors and 
the region with viable energy policy options and recommendations to guide New 
England's energy future. The Commission's Energy Program staff works closely with 
the Energy Advisors to the Governors and Energy Offices of the six New England 
states in formulating, analyzing and disseminating the output and results of the 
Energy Program, thereby achieving a measure of regional coordination in tackling 
the complex of energy problems facing the region.
The Energy Program is also involved in a broad range of projects including
examination and response to national energy policy, outer continental shelf policy 
formulation, regional petroleum and natural gas industry development programs, the 
Hew England Energy Management Information System, regional power management program, 
U.S.-Canadian cooperation on energy matters, and technical policy assistance to the 
staffs of the New England Governors on other numerous matters of regional energy 
policy formulation and analysis.
We sincerely hope that this report will be of use and will provide some contribution
to the management of New England's energy problems .y
State Cochairman

INTRODUCTION
In early 1974, the Energy Program of the New England Regional Commission 
developed the Energy Research and Policy Formulation Work Program. That 
document detailed the scope and thrust of the research which was required 
in support of state and regional efforts to understand and deal with New 
England's energy situation. Once the work program was approved by the 
Commission, a series of interrelated projects were initiated by the staff of 
the Energy Program, and contractor support was acquired to carry out several 
major studies concerning New England's energy problems. This report, which is 
a product of the insights of both the work of consultants who prepared this report, 
and the refinements of state energy officials and other professional and academic 
individuals and institutions who have reviewed the original documents upon 
which this report is based, summarizes the findings of these various research 
projects, and contains a strategy for dealing with the complex of energy issues 
facing New England.
The material in this volume is occasionally technical in nature, and, because 
care has been taken to present the logic of the strategy, and because New England's 
energy problems are indeed complicated, the report is demanding of the reader.
The interested reader will also find that the final reports from the afore­
mentioned research projects contain a wealth of technical information which is 
relevant to the suggestions made in this report.
The report first defines, in summary fashion, New England's energy problem. 
Goals and objectives for a region-wide energy program strategy are then 
suggested. Finally, mechanisms for implementing this strategy are outlined.
The strategy covers five primary areas: energy conservation; securing supplies
of fossil fuels; management of electric power; energy industry development; and 
institutional requirements. The purpose is to initiate a process of strategy for­
mulation by indentifying salient issues and opportunities and not to present 
a complete analysis of all of New England's energy alternatives, or of all of the 
consequences of any single alternative.
* * * * * * *
This report was prepared by Development Sciences Inc. under the supervision and 
direction of, and under contract with the New England Regional Commission pursuant 
to the Commission's Energy Research and Policy Formulation Program. The state­
ments, findings, and recommendations contained in the report are solely those 
of Development Sciences Inc., and do not necessarily reflect the views of the New 
England Regional Commission.
The New England Regional Commission was created under Title V of the Public 
Works and Economic Development Act of 1965, as amended. The Commission is a Fed­
eral/State Partnership whose membership is comprised of the Governors of the six 
New England States and a Federal Cochairman appointed by the President.
This report is the result of tax-supported research and as such is not copy­
rightable. It may be freely reprinted with the customary crediting of source.
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OVERVIEW
Now that time has passed since the oil embargo and its immediate 
aftermath, there has been an opportunity to reflect on the issues 
which it brought to our attention. We no longer speak of an energy 
crisis, but of solving our energy problems. It is therefore time to 
take stock and assess the implications of our energy situation in its 
many dimensions. Like the rest of the nation, and the world, New 
Englanders will have to prepare to deal with a future in which the oil 
on which we are almost totally dependent will be in ever shorter supply 
at increasingly higher prices. While the goal of moving away from oil 
is clear, the questions of timing, alternatives, prices, and reliability 
of supply are replete with difficulties. If we move too quickly, we 
forego the advantages of efficient utilization of the remaining 'easy' 
fuels and will be at a comparative disadvantage with the rest of the 
nation. If we move too slowly, we will have to respond to major shifts 
later with great social sacrifice. If we choose the wrong alternatives, 
we will be saddled with capital equipment which will have to be paid 
for again and again over the years. Dealing with this situation strains 
existing assumptions about traditional relations between private and 
public sectors. Thus, the foundation for a New England energy future 
is developed in this document with a sensitivity to the risks of costly 
error and the knowledge that we cannot simply mark time in our present 
position.
2Building a foundation to deal with the uncertainties of the future, 
and with the perceptions of the present, means that we will have to work in 
depth and in breadth with the factors which shape our choices. These 
factors do not lend themselves to easy summary or facile statements about 
what should be done. Rather they require a systematic and well coordinated 
series of policies and actions which will allow us to cover the breadth 
of the challenge. The document, therefore, begins with a statement of goals and 
objectives for programs which are designed to decrease the risk of the 
region's energy supply and price as well as to stimulate and protect the 
region's economy...and goals which recognize that neither public nor 
private sector can act alone in resolving the difficult choices.
The goals and objectives provide only general direction; more mean­
ingful statements are found in the deliniation of strategies to accomplish 
the stated purposes. These strategies are diverse and cover a number of 
likely situations in which energy, economics, and the long term industrial 
base of the region need to be integrated. These strategies orient toward:
(1) extending the life of scarce fuels; (2) reducing dependence on oil;
(3) increasing the use of renewable resources; (4) relating New England 
closer to the supply and price decisions taken outside of New England;
(5) minimizing the price of energy; and (6) accelerating the development 
of a New England energy industry.
The more specific design of the strategies is based on the consider­
able research done by NERCOM over the last two years and draws heavily on the 
facts generated and the debates carried on during that period. Therefore, 
the document contains elements of program strategies for conservation of
3energy, for securing supplies of fossil fuels from different sources, for 
managing electric power, and for developing a New England energy industry.
With the passage of time and the accumulation of research results obtained 
since the crisis, we have learned that the regional problem is not readily 
summarized in one aggregated statement. We have also learned that the 
answer, therefore, cannot be stated in one succinct statement covering the 
many dimensions of the issues involved. Therefore, we must move through 
the diverse structure of the problems posed by energy issues while being 
comprehensive and thorough, systematic and consistent, yet able to deal 
with the unique and transient forms which world, national, and regional 
forces will impose on us.
Conservation is one of the keystones of policy in dealing with the 
systemic energy needs, for only through demand management and the develop­
ment of supplemental sources can a reasonably smooth transition to a new 
energy base be accomplished. Improvements in the efficiency of energy use, 
and replacement of some of our scarce fuels by renewable resources, can help 
insure against discontinuities in our energy supplies. During the transition 
we will still rely on fossil fuels, and that means directions for the ex­
ploiting of Georges Bank for both fish and oil; an active program for locating 
petroleum facilities; a recognition of the importance of natural gas, both 
if 1t runs out early or if it is found near New England; an appreciation 
of the role coal can play in present or future forms; and an international 
trade program to stabilize our foreign sources of supply. Along with 
conservation and a measured approach to fossil fuels, the management of 
electric power becomes imperative. Capacity planning, load management, 
supplemental fuels, fuel conversion, and nuclear power are all on the
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4agenda of the management of electric power. Nor can strategies overlook 
the economic development potential of the energy industry for New England 
Incentives need to be provided to develop a diverse energy industry; in­
vestments will have to be secured; and research in support of program 
objectives will have to be undertaken. In sum, the strategies need to 
be sweeping in scope and sensitive in depth to the ever changing market 
conditions and the ability of consumers to adapt to the changes thrust 
upon them.
To accomplish these strategies, implementation mechanisms will have 
to be developed. The world, the nation, and New England are each moving 
from one energy management system to another. Sometimes the moves have 
been sudden and sometimes barely visible to the naked eye. We are moving 
nonetheless and it is imperative that we are conscious of our direction 
and, as much as possible, master of our fate. This cannot be achieved 
without innovative and dynamic leadership from both the public and private 
sectors.
No satisfactory foundation for a New England energy future can be 
constructed and implemented without the hard work of highly aware and 
deeply committed institutions. Mechanisms are developed to give New England 
leadership the means to operate in the difficult environment where con­
sensus is absent and choices are filled with large consequences. For 
move we must and, like it or not, we are already driven to change.
Building the New England energy future need not be fearsome nor done in 
an air of pessimism. In fact, there are always opportunities in change 
and the programs and strategies presented are designed to create and take
5advantage of the opportunities as well as to protect and preserve New 
England's future.
When that future is contemplated, the policy which will bring us 
to the desired end is summarized in three main thrusts. The first is 
conservation. Conservation is essential to minimize the need for us to 
make an untimely choice from among the undesirable alternatives of present 
day oil, coal, or nuclear power technologies. Conservation is critical to 
buy time for us to develop alternatives more suited to New England's long­
term needs. It is also critical that we reduce our wasteful depletion of 
precious resources.
Buying time is, however, not sufficient for we must live with what 
is here now or on the horizon. For that reason the second thrust is 
toward more effective utilization of remaining fossil energy. Much of the 
program development is dedicated to making the sources of fossil energy 
more secure, and to trying to keep the price of energy from retarding the 
New England economy. A phased and balanced program of development of 
Georges Bank potential and of dealing with imports follows on the heels 
of a conservation program.
Neither conservation nor substitution for oil by coal and nuclear 
power provide a sufficient answer in the long run. Ultimate acceptable 
solutions will draw on many fuels and sources of energy. It should be 
the third keystone of New England policy that the economic development 
opportunities to be found in these varied solutions should be secured 
for New England. The goals of economic development and secure energy 
sources can reinforce one another. Linking economic development with
has been elevated to a major public issue. And because energy is essential 
to the maintenance of the quality of life and to the continuance of 
economic functions, there is no responsible way to avoid dealing with 
energy security issues head-on and effectively.
THE ENERGY PROBLEM IN NEW ENGLAND 
In New England, the problems triggered by the embargo fall into two 
areas of serious concern to public officials and their constituents. The 
first is security of energy supply. The second is security of the regional 
economy in the face of yet another growth-mitigating force. The problems 
are complicated, but certain conditions which cause them to be both real 
and potentially devastating to the region deserve both recognition and 
effort to change:
CONDITION ONE: MANAGEMENT OF ENERGY SUPPLY AND PRICE - New England 
is in the unfortunate position of being physically distant from the 
sources of its needed fossil fuels (e.g., residual oil from Venezuela, 
natural gas from the Southwest) as well as organizationally distant 
from decisions regarding the development, distribution, and pricing 
of these fuels. From a management point of view, this is risky—  
especially when the commodity involved is essential, is primarily 
controlled by a very few number of organizations, and is known to be 
in short supply. For example, New England's demands for oil are not 
sufficient enough for the region to have clout with OPEC. New 
England's ties with the major domestic oil companies are also loose 
and tenuous; the region has been an outlet for excess product of 
domestic refineries, and is not (yet) a major factor in the invest­
ment decisions of the major members of the oil (or energy) industry. 
The only developed line of communication between New England and 
major fossil fuel supply and price decisions is to Washington, and 
this link is subject to the vicissitudes of national and regional 
politics. Furthermore, the physical distance from sources of fossil 
fuels means that the region pays a price premium for the transportation 
of oil, gas, and coal to New England users. Thus, with limited re­
serves of fossil fuels, little or no regional fossil fuel extraction 
and processing industry, varying degrees of influence over Washington- 
based energy decisions, and fuel demands which are not large enough to 
influence price or supply through traditional market mechanisms, New 
England lacks influence over its suppliers of fossil fuels, and is 
forced to pay the price penalties associated with dealing with distant 
fuel sources. This means that the region is currently fully exposed
9to the risks of supply interruptions and price increases or dis­
parities and is only minimally able to manage these risks. Adding 
to this condition of limited influence is the fact that well over 
eighty percent of the region's energy requirements are met by oil 
products"; over ninety percent of the requirements are satisfied by 
oil and natural gas together. It is estimated that the worldwide 
reserves of these fossil fuels could supply estimated demands for 25 
to 40 years, Thus, New England is not only vulnerable because of 
distance from its sources of fossil fuels and from energy supply and 
price decisions, it is also exposed to the risk that the fuels which 
it uses to heat buildings and run machinery will simply not be avail­
able in the near future— from any source. Domestic additions to 
natural gas reserves, for example, have been declining for the last 
10 years. A continuation in this decline could mean that by 1990 
only a little more than one-half of New England's requirements will 
be able to be met from domestic supplies of natural gas.
CONDITION TWO: DOUBTS OVER NUCLEAR POWER - Currently, the only
proven large-scale energy production technology which provides New 
England with an alternative to its almost complete reliance of petroleum- 
based fossil fuels is electricity generation from nuclear power plants. 
Ironically, however, the proliferation of nuclear power is constrained 
by a series of problems. (In the case of the debate over nuclear 
power, most of these problems have a dual constituency— one arguing 
that the problem is real, the other that it is not.) The problems 
include the possible scarcity of domestic uranium, reliability and 
cost of the nuclear power plant, safety of the plant, security of the 
plant and the nuclear fuel distribution system, and adequacy of nuclear 
waste disposal methods. These technical problems, however debatable, 
stand in the way of new plant construction, and are receiving substan­
tial attention by federal agencies, electric utilities, state agencies, 
system vendors, public interest groups, and private and public research 
organizations. In New England, these technical problems are compli­
cated by declining public confidence in electric utilities and their 
regulators. Furthermore, there is evidence that the region's utilities 
have excess generating capacity, and that much less expansion than 
was formerly planned is required in order to meet future demands for 
electricity. This could result in an inability to justify a signifi­
cant increase in the number of nuclear plants over the next fifteen 
years, thus limiting the rate at which nuclear power plants can replace 
fossil fuel-based plants. Finally, decreased availability of capital 
to New England utilities may severely limit the ability of electric 
utilities to finance whatever expansion they can justify.
CONDITION THREE: ECONOMIC DECLINE - The rapid emergence of the South,
Southwest, and West as high growth economies reflects a movement of 
new investment away from the "older" regions of the country and toward 
those which are richer in resources, closer to growing national markets, 
relatively near sources of reasonably priced energy, and which enjoy a 
mild climate. The many locational disadvantages of New'Ehgland cause 
the regional economy to be vulnerable to forces which increase these 
disadvantages to the point where local industry is no longer able to
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compete in the national market place. Thus, New England's 
economy is fragile relative to those regions that enjoy the 
comparative advantages sought by business. This fragility 
is most apparent when national recessionary, or inflationary, 
conditions are clearly amplified throughout the region (such 
as during the 1974-1975 period) and when economic recovery 
(e.g., reduction in the unemployment rate) lags far behind 
other parts of the country. This economic environment inter­
acts with the energy problem in three ways. First, the con­
sequences of increased energy prices are severe (e.g., to 
unemployed persons and to already financially distressed or 
marginal businesses) and, therefore, require more public 
attention. Second, capital may not be attracted for invest­
ments in facilities that might alleviate some of the energy 
problem. Third, the image of economic decline, high energy 
prices, vulnerability to energy shortages, and apparent 
hostility toward industrial development may cause some indus­
tries and investors to look away from New England for their 
next investments.
New England's limited control over its energy future is hardly a 
new phenomenon— the region has been exposed to the risk of aberrations 
in energy supply and price for many years. Before the risk became an 
event (the embargo) rather than a possibility, neither the threat of a 
serious problem nor the information concerning its likelihood and its 
impact on New England was sufficient enough to cause (or, perhaps, 
require) action-taking at the public level. Now, however, the problem 
is understood as more than vulnerability to foreign oil producers. New 
England is currently and almost totally at the "end of the line," and 
it is consuming fuels that are dangerously close to the end of their 
lifetimes and is paying a dear price to do so. Now action-taking is 
warranted. But what should be done? And what can be done?
GOALS FOR NEW ENGLAND 
Because of New England's precarious position vis-a-vis energy, none 
of the answers to the questions of "what should" and "what can" be done can
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be expected to "solve" the region's energy problems. Indeed, many of 
the alternatives available to New England are themselves risky and fraught 
with caveats. Some of the alternatives are even difficult to justify 
without more information than is currently available. Thus, the region's 
energy problems not only require immediate and decisive attention by our 
policy-makers— they require also a willingness and preparedness to adjust
a chosen course in response to new information and new options. This
means that New England's need is twofold— for a policy (direction) on the 
one hand, and for an energy management capability on the other. Both 
must be flexible without sacrificing definitive action-taking and progress 
toward a realizable set of goals.
Energy goals for New England should provide a framework for developing 
and implementing both a time-phased program of energy-related actions and 
a legal and institutional structure which facilitates the timely implemen­
tation of these actions. The goals for the region should also allow, or
even stimulate, a diversity in the programs of the individual states. Properly
coordinated, this diversity can strengthen both the region's energy program 
and the individual state programs. Finally, the goals should help to focus 
effort on the most crucial of the region's current and possible future 
energy-related problems.
Although New England's energy goals must be defined by those who 
shoulder the burden of determining and implementing the region's energy 
policy, the energy problem is well enough understood to outline the 
essential elements so that a context for change is established. The two­
fold challenge to establish directions for action-taking, and to create a 
capability to manage, translates into a requirement for: (1) goals which
12
guide action-program formulation (programmatic goals); and (2) goals which 
guide the process of developing a capability to implement desirable programs 
(institutional goals).
. Programmatic Goals
- To decrease the region's energy supply and price risks.
- To stimulate and protect the region's economy.
. Institutional Goals
- To cause public and private organizations to act in a manner 
which reinforces programmatic goals, which conscientiously 
protects the health and welfare of individuals, and which 
preserves the quality of the region's environment.
- To provide information which makes it possible: (a) to refine
or re-direct on-going programs; (b) to define, select, and 
implement new ones; and (c) to anticipate and deal with energy- 
related problems before they occur.
- To seek an appropriate balance bmong private, state, and multi­
state energy planning and action-taking.
Alone, these goals have limited utility. Supported by definite 
strategies for their attainment, they become meaningful.
PROGRAM STRATEGY: OBJECTIVES
There is no single action which will meet the energy challenges of 
New England. The best which can be done is to attack the problem on all 
fronts while working toward better solutions in the future. In line with the 
stated goals for New England's energy program, a "good" strategy should:
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. Reduce energy supply and price risks, especially the risks of:
- Partial or complete reduction of supplies of one or more fuels 
from one or more sources.
- Severe or total depletion of the reserves of one or more of 
the fuels which the region relies heavily upon.
- Drastic and rapid increases in the price of one or more fuel.
- Long-term disparities between the average price paid by New England 
for its energy and that paid by its economic competitors (domestic 
and foreign) for their energy.
. Contribute to the solution of some of the region's economic problems,
especially those which are exacerbated by:
- Decline or stagnation of existing industries as a result of 
declining competitive position due in part to relatively higher 
costs for energy for processing, space heating and lighting, and 
distribution.
- Threats to the viability of certain existing industries as a result 
of uncertainties regarding the availability of fuels for process 
energy.
- Gradual out-migration of industry from the region, and limited 
replacement of lost jobs by expansions of existing businesses end 
by the in-migration or formation of new businesses, due in part 
because of the region's energy prices and supply uncertainties.
Thus, a good program strategy would lead toward more energy supply 
security for essential and desirable economic functions, would reduce (or 
prevent a worsening in) the energy price differential between New England
14
and other regions of the country, and would help increase employment in the 
region.
A four-point energy program strategy is recommended. The key elements 
of the strategy are:
1. Energy Conservation
2. Securing supplies of fossil fuels
3. Management of electric power generation
4. Development of a New England energy industry
The strategies are directed at a number of end-results, the most
important of which are to:
. Extend the life of scarce fuels.
. Reduce dependence on petroleum-based fuels.
. Increase the utilization of renewable fuel sources.
. Decrease the "distance" between New England and its sources of
fossil fuels and/or the sources of fuel supply or price decisions.
. Minimize the price of electricity.
. Improve New England's economic competitive position by minimizing 
unnecessary fuel price disparities, and by minimizing the average 
cost of energy (i.e., the cost of the fuel mix).
. Accelerate development of a New England energy industry.
PROGRAM ELEMENT ONE: Energy Conservation
This first element of the program strategy consists of two components—  
demand management and use of supplemental sources of energy. Conservation is 
so essential to the program strategy that it should be considered the key­
stone to the region's energy policy.
Demand Management - The objective for the demand management component is to 
increase the efficiency of energy use in New England. Reductions in energy
15
consumption per unit of activity and the reduction of certain activities are 
methods which, once employed, will lead toward a dampening of the growth of 
regional energy demands.
Supplemental Sources - The immediate objective for the supplemental source 
component is to replace some fossil or nuclear fuels with energy derived 
from renewable resources (e.g., from solar energy, solid waste, wood, wind, 
etc.). The long-term objective is to have base-load demands satisfied by 
renewable or replenishable sources of energy rather than by fossil sources 
which have limited lifetimes.
Purposes - The conservation element of the program strategy accomplishes 
two important purposes. Conservation extends the life of scarce fossil 
fuels on the one hand and (through the supplemental source component of the 
strategy) allows for their "best" use, e.g., oil and natural gas for mobile 
sources, process energy, chemical feedstocks, and space heating in large 
densely populated urban areas. In extending the life of scarce fossil 
fuels, conservation buys valuable time for research and development on 
methods for utilizing various forms of solar energy (e.g. photovoltaic 
cells for conversion of solar energy to electricity, heat engines for 
conversion of ocean thermogradients to electricity, production of a storable 
and transportable fuel (hydrogen) from solar-generated electricity, windmills 
for electricity generation, and so on).
Development of supplemental energy sources also leads toward new jobs 
for New Englanders in equipment fabrication, construction, and facility 
operation. Many of these jobs would otherwise be added to the economies of 
those who supply New England with its fossil fuels.
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PROGRAM ELEMENT TWO: Securing Supplies of Fossil Fuels
The second element of the program strategy contains five components—  
development of potential Georges Bank offshore oil and gas reserves, de­
velopment of regional petroleum refining and processing facilities, main­
tenance of natural gas supplies, development of indigenous coal reserves 
and/or acquisition of coal from other sources, and establishment of trade 
agreements for nondomestic energy resources.
Georges Bank - The objective for the Georges Bank development component of 
the strategy is twofold. First, the strategy is to assure that if the Bank 
contains economically developable quantities of oil and/or gas, and if the 
policy of the federal government continues to favor accelerated development 
rather than strategic use (or nonuse) of our remaining oil reserves, 
the oil and gas will be brought into New England for processing and distri­
bution. The second objective is to find and implement methods for developing 
the Bank which do not compromise the short- or long-term health of the New 
England offshore or inshore fishery and fishing industry.
Petroleum Facilities - The objectives for the petroleum facility development 
component of the strategy are to encourage environmentally and economically 
sound proposals to create a regional capacity to receive and refine crude oil 
as well as to distribute product, and to increase the capacity of product 
storage facilities to a level sufficient to cover demands during the period 
between potential supply interruptions and reallocation of domestic output.
A sub-objective is to begin preparation for processing the possible oil from 
development of Georges Bank.
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Natural Gas - The objective for the natural gas component of the strategy 
is to provide the gas industry with incentives to increase or maintain the 
supply of natural gas to New England-through accelerated exploration for 
new developable reserves» through additional importation of liquefied natural 
gas» and through increased liquefaction and storage of off-season supplies 
of domestic pipeline gas. A sub-objective is to maintain the viability of 
the existing New England gas industry so that the region is prepared for the 
possible natural gas finds on Georges Bank.
Coal - The objective for the coal development component of the strategy is 
to determine whether or not it is economically, socially, and environmentally 
desirable to make it possible for New England electric utilities to acquire 
and receive coal instead of residual oil for burning in existing or new 
fossil fuel plants. The coal could come from possible indigenous reserves 
(the Narragansett Basin) or from southern deep mines (by barge and/or rail) 
or from western surface mines (by rail or slurry pipeline). Ex-regional 
coal could be converted at or near the mine to gas or electricity, which 
could be transmitted to New England via pipeline or wire. If it is 
desirable and feasible to substantially increase coal supplies to New 
England, the objective will be to encourage electric utilities to switch 
from oil to coal, thereby conserving scarce oil or releasing it for better uses.
Trade - The objective for the trade agreement component of the strategy is 
to establish a method for acquiring foreign energy resources which is based 
upon an exchange of goods and services for energy. This would provide the 
region with a more direct means to establishing a mutually dependent re­
lationship with foreign suppliers. An outlet for New England goods and 
services also would be developed.
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Purposes - The supply security element of the program strategy serves five 
important purposes. First, it results in a partial shift in the region's 
sources of oil from foreign or distant domestic sources to sources within 
or close to the region. Second, it provides encouragement to industry to 
develop new reserves of fossil fuels. Third, it establishes a closer 
two-way relationship between the region and foreign suppliers. Fourth, 
it may result in a fossil fuel mix that is more balanced; e.g. in which 
coal replaces considerable amounts of residual oil. Finally, this element 
of the strategy leads to increased regional employment in jobs associated 
with the development of a regional energy industry and with the trade 
arrangements established with foreign suppliers.
PROGRAM ELEMENT THREE: Management of Electric Power
The third element of the program strategy consists of five components—  
capacity planning, management of rate structures and demand loads, utilization 
of supplemental fuels, conversion from oil to coal, and increased use of 
nuclear plants.
Capacity Planning - The objective for the capacity planning component of 
the strategy is to assure that the mix of generating and transmission 
facilities results in the lowest possible cost of electricity and, especially, 
that total generating capacity does not exceed the requirements to meet demand 
and to provide reasonable reliability factors. A related objective is to 
streamline the process for siting a new facility so as to reduce the lead 
time for adding new capacity.
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Load Management - The objective for the load management component is to 
define and implement rate structures and other demand management methods 
that will result in the leveling of load over the transmission period, 
i.e., that will cause a redistribution of load so as to reduce peak loads 
while increasing off-peak loads. Load management has the potential for 
reducing needs for new capacity through more efficient utilization of ex­
isting capacity. It may also result in reductions in the cost of electricity 
to consumers.
Supplemental Fuel - The objective for the supplemental fuel component of 
the strategy is to cause, where feasible, the use of energy resources such 
as refuse-derived fuel, wood, and wood waste as supplements to oil or coal 
for firing utility boilers. A second objective is to develop mechanisms 
which encourage small-scale on-site generation of electricity from 9uch 
sources as windmills, water-powered turbines, and fuel cells in a manner 
that is complementary to, and compatible with, generation from large plants.
Conversion - The objective for the coal conversion component of the program 
strategy is to achieve, where economically, socially, and environmentally 
feasible, a balance in the power plant fossil fuel mix between residual 
oil and coal.
Nuclear Power - The objective for the nuclear power plant component of the 
strategy is to determine how to overcome the cost, reliability, safety, and 
waste disposal problems of nuclear generating plants. The ultimate 
objective is to optimize the nuclear fraction of new base-load capacity 
additions as long as the plants are competitive with fossil fuel or other 
alternatives and as long as a long-term supply of nuclear fuel is assured.
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PurPP.ses - Two primary purposes are served by the electric power manage­
ment element of the program strategy. The most important result of the 
strategy is that, through sound planning for new capacity, load manage­
ment, and use of supplementary fuels, the cost of generating electricity 
can be kept at a minimum. The second result is a partial shift in fuel ' 
consumption from scarce and expensive oil to more abundant coal and to 
renewable or replenishable energy sources.
PROGRAM ELEMENT FOUR: Energy Industry Development
The final element of the program strategy is composed of two components—  
investments in new energy industry enterprises and incentives for energy 
industry development. Each component is intended to stimulate development 
of an energy industry in New England— through formations of new businesses', 
through attraction of expansion facilities of ex-regional companies, and 
through expansion of existing New England businesses.
Investment - The objectives for the investment component of the strategy 
are to make land available for certain energy industry development and to 
make capital available to qualified new enterprises that are engaged in 
the development and marketing of promising new energy technologies. Of 
particular interest are those technologies that are based on the use of 
renewable energy sources, or that utilize the energy potential of solid or 
liquid wastes or waste heat,or that substantially improve the efficiency 
of energy conversion or consumption.
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Incentives - The objective for the incentives component of the strategy 
is to develop and implement a series of incentive mechanisms that are 
sufficient to make New England an attractive location for businesses 
engaged in energy R&D, extraction, processing, and distribution.
Purposes - Three purposes are served by this element of the program 
strategy. Development of an energy industry will add substantially to 
the job base of the region. Energy industry development also will pro­
vide, because of the image of growth and the economic multipliers associ­
ated with the energy production cycle, a stimulus to the regional economy 
in general. Finally, the existence of a flourishing full-scope energy 
industry in New England will provide the region with more direct access 
to possible solutions to its long-range energy problems.
Summary
As was promised in the Overview, the recommended program strategy is 
complex, broadly scoped, and systematically interrelated. An aggressive 
program of energy conservation, through demand management as well as de­
velopment of supplemental and renewable sources of energy, is the keystone 
to the entire strategy. Because conservation alone does not "solve" New 
England's energy problems, actions in support of securing the region's 
necessary supplies of fossil fuels are suggested. Improved management of 
electric power, in turn, is viewed as inextricably linked to both the con­
servation strategy and the fossil fuel strategy. Finally, economic develop­
ment through stimulation of energy industry development is proposed as an 
opportunity for the region to deal with its economic and energy needs in 
a unified program.
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To summarize, the program strategy elements and components, and their 
respective objectives, are listed below:
fHE OBJECTIVE OF: IS TO:
The ENERGY CONSERVATION element
-the Demand Management component 
-the Supplemental Sources component
The SECURING SUPPLIES OF 
FOSSIL FUELS element
-the Georges Bank component
-the Petroleum Facilities component
-the Natural Gas component
-the Coal, component
-the Trade component
The MANAGEMENT OF ELECTRIC POWER 
element
-the Capacity Planning component 
-the Load Management component 
-the Supplemental Fuel component 
-the Conversion component 
-the Nuclear Power component
The ENERGY INDUSTRY DEVELOPMENT 
element
-the Investment component
-the Incentives component
Reduce consumption of non­
renewable resources
Reduce energy consumption
Utilize renewable resources
Reduce fossil fuel supply and 
price risks
Co-develop oil and fish resources
Reduce oil supply risks
Maintain or increase gas supplies
Consider increases in coal 
supplies
Secure foreign oil
Minimize electricity price and 
balance fuel mix
Optimize generation capacity
Reduce demands for new capacity
Utilize renewable resources
Switch from oil to coal
Switch from oil to nuclear
Stimulate economic growth
Sponsor new business ventures 
Stimulate private investment
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The following section explores in greater detail some of the more 
important factors that bear upon New England's ability to meet these 
objectives» and suggests some mechanisms for initiating a course of action.
PROGRAM STRATEGY: IMPLEMENTATION MECHANISMS
A strategic attack on the energy problems of New England is a demanding 
task. There does not exist one dominant and large-scale method, or even a 
few, for reducing the region's exposure to energy risks. Thus, the attack 
must be eclectic without sacrificing comprehensiveness. However, the danger 
inherent in a diverse program is that the many elements of the program may 
be implemented in such a way that future options are closed off, or that 
some actions do not complement others. Thus, the attack must be systematic 
and cognizant of the timing and consequences of results without compromising 
flexibility to redirect the program in the future.
Unfortunately, the power and will to launch and continue such a
strategic program in New England may be so diffused among local, state, 
regional, and federal public officials, private industry, public interest 
groups, and private citizens that incentives to act in the common interest, 
and accountability for actions and results, are so obfuscated and diversely 
interpreted that leadership is likely to be subordinated to a myriad of 
ad hoc confrontations. Thus, the attack must facilitate effective appli­
cations of the authorities and influence of the six New England governors 
so that key actors within and outside the region are stimulated to act in
a manner which reinforces the program strategy.
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These three demands for implementing the program strategy— that 
implementation be eclectic, that it be systematic and flexible, and that 
the authorities of the governors be applied effectively— form a basis for 
disaggregating the program strategy objectives into mechanisms for imple­
mentation. These mechanisms then can serve as a menu for action program 
formulation by the several states of New England.
Energy Conservation
Now that the price of energy is high, and the proven reserves of most 
fuels are dwindling rapidly, efficient use of energy not only makes sense—  
it is essential. Energy conservation is particularly important to New 
England. It is through conservation, for example, that the region can 
most significantly protect against the impacts of higher fuel prices. For, 
by reducing consumption, more family income, business profits, and tax­
payers' dollars will be available for investment in the New England economy. 
And, because conservation extends the life of scarce fuels, the region "buys" 
valuable time for better energy production methods to be perfected and 
cmmercialized. Furthermore, conservation actions seldom have negative en­
vironmental consequences. Thus, conservation is good per se, and good be­
cause it is the best way to make it possible to avoid having to make un­
timely decisions to implement undesirable or underdeveloped energy pro­
duction technologies. (Of course, if this added time is not used 
effectively, this benefit of conservation is wholly or partially foregone.)
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There are three methods for conserving scarce fuels. One is to 
reduce the amount of energy used per energy consuming activity (e.g., 
to decrease the gasoline consumed per vehicle-mile traveled). Another 
is to reduce the amount of energy consuming activity (e.g., to decrease 
the number of vehicle-miles traveled). The third method is to replace 
nonrenewable fuels with energy derived from renewable or replenishable 
resources (e.g., solar heating systems for buildings). Whereas the 
first two methods can be classified as demand management techniques, 
the third method is, in actuality, a form of fuel switching in which the 
switch is partial and, thus, to a supplemental fuel which is (or can be) 
in infinite supply. The three methods are interrelated and are not in 
conflict with one another if they are carefully implemented.
Demand Management* - Research on energy demands indicates 
that if in the future the region's energy consuming sectors are no more 
efficient in their use of energy than they were in 1974, then by 1990 New 
England will require more than 60 percent more energy than it required in 
1974. This increase of almost two quadrillion Btu's (quads) of input 
energy is roughly equivalent to over 900,000 barrels of oil per day- 
enough to keep four good size refineries running at full capacity.
It is estimated that a comprehensive program of demand management 
could reduce New England's projected energy needs by over 20 percent by 1990. 
This would mean that the region's incremental energy requirements (over 
1974 demands) would be about cut in half. For certain fuels, especially
* The data in this section are based, in part, on the work by Arthur D.
Little, Inc. for the Energy Program of the New England Regional Commission. 
See, especially, ADL's report to NERC0M entitled "Preliminary Projections 
of New England's Energy Requirements" (September 1975).
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natural gas, distillate oil, and gasoline, incremental requirements can be 
reduced by approximately 60 percent to 90 percent. Table 1 illustrates 
some of the fuel savings achievable through increased energy use efficiencies 
The first column shows that, on the average, the region's 1990 energy demands 
could be over 1.62 times the 1974 demands. The second column indicates that 
demand management could reduce this multiple to 1.29 times 1974 demands. The 
third column shows that this savings is equivalent to over half of the pro­
jected incremental demand for the 1974-1990 period.
TABLE 1
SOME 1990 ENERGY SAVINGS THROUGH DEMAND MANAGEMENT
GASOLINE 
DISTILLATE OIL 
NATURAL GAS 
RESIDUAL OIL* 
ELECTRICITY 
ALL FOSSIL FUELS
TOTAL INPUT ENERGY 
(weighted average)
* Residual oil savings are based on projections in which the 1990 ratio
of nuclear power plant generating capacity to fossil fuel plant
capacity is assumed to be roughly the same as for 1974.
Incremental Requirements 
Over 1974 Demands
Incremental Energy 
Saved Through 
Demand ManagementBase Case Demand Management
48% 4% 92%
39% 8% 80%
30% 13% 56%
73% 46% 37%
104% 70% 31%
I
54% 23% 57%
1 62% 29% 53%
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These savings will occur only if the sectors which consume energy are 
motivated to take whatever actions are required to minimize the growth in 
regional energy input requirements. In New England, the prime targets for 
imporved efficiency of energy use are the residential, commercial, and 
transportation sectors. It is possible, over the next fifteen years, to 
reduce the expected growth in consumption of energy for space heating and 
cooling, for lighting and applicances, and for transportation, by between 
20 percent and 30 percent. Specifically, projected 1990 demands for 
energy by:
. The RESIDENTIAL sector can be reduced by— 23% (0.2 Quads)
. The COMMERCIAL sector can be reduced by— 21% (0.2 Quads)
. The TRANSPORTATION sector can be reduced by— 28% (0.3 Quads)
Reduced demands by the residential and commercial sectors will, in 
turn, lead toward a fuel savings of approximately 18 percent (or 0.3 Quads) 
by electric utilities.
The New England industrial sector as a whole has limited ability to 
save energy through efficiency measures (NERCOM estimates show potential 
average industrial energy savings at less than 5%). However, certain 
industries, such as textile mills, apparel, paper products, and electrical 
equipment can achieve up to 20 percent savings in energy for processing 
by making certain changes in their production processes. Furthermore, 
industry can cause other forms of energy savings through shared waste 
treatment, materials reuse, and utilization of waste heat.
Conservation of energy does more than save scarce fuels. It also 
saves money. The 20 percent reduction in 1990 energy consumption will,
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for example, reduce New England's annual energy bill by almost $2 billion, 
or an average saving of over $350 per household per year.* In addition, 
this level of energy savings results in reduced needs for refining capacity 
and for additional power plants. Thus, scarce capital is freed for other 
purposes— including investments in alternative energy production technologies. 
For example, the 20 percent reduction in energy consumption means that be­
tween now and 1990:
. Two refineries (at 250,000 barrels per day capacity) will not
need to be built. This will save about...... .............$1.3 billion
. Over 5,900 megawatts of power generating capacity will not
need to be built. This will save about.............. *.7T?i$6.0 billion
Perhaps the most important consequence of efficient energy use is
that it extends the life of scarce fossil fuels. If, hypothetically,
New England had its own captive source of oil, a 20 percent reduction in
demand would add a year or so to the life of the oil reserve for every
five years in which the region achieved the savings. This extension of
reserve life becomes particularly meaningful to New England if the region
achieves a reasonable measure of control over the rate of development,
processing, and distribution of potential Georges Bank oil.
The level of energy use efficiency which is required of New England
will take time to achieve. It also takes a strong commitment on the
part of the states to see to it that steps are taken to initiate and
sustain an effective set of action programs. Listed below are some
mechanisms which might comprise the various programs.
* In 1975 dollars.
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VOLUNTARY
CONSERVATION
GENERAL
A. Voluntary conservation of energy could occur on a 
massive scale if the public feels a need for their 
actions and, in turn, perceives that there will be 
some tangible payoff. Once public behavior towards 
energy consumption, and especially toward investments 
in conservation methods, is changed— progress toward 
an energy efficient regional economy will be greatly 
accelerated. A comprehensive region-wide campaign to 
seek voluntary reduction in the consumption of all 
forms of energy by all consuming sectors is warranted. 
Precious fuels will be saved for their best uses, and 
the consumer will save money. This campaign could 
include: (a) a concentrated effort to develop an 
understanding of the costs to the region of not re­
ducing energy consumption and of the dollar savings 
accrued if consumption is reduced; (b) educational 
programs in which people— as students, as private 
consumers, as participants in local government, and 
as members of industry— learn alternatives to 
present energy practices; and (c) technical assistance 
from state and regional organizations to local 
communities that are interested in implementing con­
servation programs.
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LAND
USE
STATE
EXAMPLE-
SETTING
B. Statewide land use controls that are designed to en­
courage development patterns that lead to efficient use 
of scarce natural resources could have a profound impact 
on future energy consumption in New England. However, 
federal and state agencies have only recently begun to 
define land use in the context of energy consumption. 
This new information should be understood so that it 
can influence the design of future land-use legislation 
before it is introduced.
C. The public sector is in a position to provide visible 
leadership in energy conservation. To demonstrate this 
leadership, all New England state agencies, and all 
public and private organizations which receive funds 
from the several states or from the New England Regional 
Commission, could be required to develop and implement 
energy conservation "positive performance" programs 
which are exemplary to the citizens and institutions
of New England. Once committed to, these programs 
should be strictly enforced, especially those elements 
related to transportation (e.g., fleet size and mix, 
vehicle speed limits), space heating, and use of 
electricity (especially for lighting).
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SPEED
LIMITS
VEHICLE
EFFICIENCY
TRANSPORTATION
A. The 55-mile per hour speed limit for motor vehicles 
can result in substantial reductions in gasoline 
consumption. It also seems to have caused a reduction 
in the auto-related fatility rate. Unfortunately, 
motorists are showing signs of pre-embargo (speeding) 
behavior. To assure continued savings in gasoline, 
the states can enforce, stringently and with con­
sistently severe state-to-state penalties for vio­
lation, the current speed limits. The federal govern­
ment should be encouraged to maintain this policy
at the national level.
B. Improving the energy efficiency of motor vehicles 
is one of the most important factors in acheiving 
any significant reduction in energy requirements 
for transportation. The states can implement, 
through taxation and public information programs, 
disincentives for the sale in New England of auto­
mobiles and trucks that do not meet reasonably 
established standards of operating efficiency.
Federal standards, however, would be most desirable 
and should be encouraged. The efficiency standards 
could be increased gradually starting with the 1979 
model year; tax penalties could be keyed to the 
results of EPA vehicle fuel consumption tests.
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CAR
POOLING
MASS
TRANSIT
C. From a technological point of view, the simplest, 
and potentially the most effective, method for 
achieving a more energy-efficient transportation 
system is to increase the number of passengers per 
commuter vehicle-mile. The states can develop 
aggressive progrmas, through parking fees and regu­
lations, variable tolls on roads and other access- 
ways to cities, and reserved highway lanes, to en­
courage car pooling in metropolitan areas for 
commuter trips to and from place of work.
D. A well-utilized mass transit system is an energy 
efficient alternative to the private automobile for 
trips within an urban area. Improvements in the 
region's transit systems are gradually occurring as 
increased federal funding becomes available. The 
states can accelerate this process by supplementing 
current and planned federal funding for improvements 
in mass transportation systems with funds from state 
motor vehicle fuel tax collections, and by actively 
seeking to improve not only opportunities for the 
commuting/traveling public to use mass transportation 
but also to improve the level of service, quality, 
and marketing of existing and planned systems. These 
transit programs can include mechanisms for achieving 
better use of existing traditional transit facilities
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MASS
TRANSIT
(continued)
FREIGHT
OPERATIONS
INTERCITY 
RAIL, BUS
(especially buses) as well as facilities such as taxis 
and jitneys. They can also be designed to creatively 
use rolling stock for nonpassenger purposes during off- 
peak hours. Finally, it may be feasible for certain 
transit systems to utilize replenishable fuels— such 
as refuse-derived fuel for electric power generation.
E. The pattern of truck and rail freight operations, 
especially truck operations in and around SMSA's and 
rail freight service between urban centers, has a sig­
nificant impact on the energy efficiency of goods dis­
tribution within New England. The states, in cooperation 
with federal agencies and industry, can develop programs 
for Improving the logistics of goods movement and ware­
housing and for minimizing unnecessary consumption of 
energy throughout the distribution system.
F. Increased intercity travel by rail or bus can result in 
substantial savings in energy if travelers are diverted 
from more energy-intensive means of transportation (e.g., 
from airlines or private automobiles). The states can 
stimulate these alternative modes of intercity travel
by developing, in cooperation with industry and agencies 
of the federal government, programs to improve intercity 
rail and bus passenger service through improvements in 
the existing rail beds, additions of new equipment, im­
proved marketing and level of service, and more efficient 
linkages to other transportation modes.
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EFFICIENCY
STANDARDS:
NEW
CONSTRUCTION
INCENTIVES
FOR
UPGRADING
CURRENT
SYSTEMS
SPACE HEATING AND COOLING
A. Space heating and cooling is currently one of the 
largest sources of energy waste iin New England. It is 
also the energy use function which can be most easily 
managed through proper use of design principles and 
through application of proven technologies.
To assure that consumption is a primary factor in the 
design of structures in the region, the states can 
establish statewide performance standards0 for the 
energy efficiency of all new buildings, including 
specific standards for heat loss and energy consumption 
per unit of usable space. The standards can also in­
clude stand-by provisions for discouraging the ex­
panded use of specific fuels. These standards could 
apply to all new buildings, and to additions to current 
structures. The states can demonstrate the seriousness 
of this program by instituting the standards immediately 
for any new state office buildings.
B. The most serious space heating problems in the region
are the lack of insulation and inefficient heating systems 
extant among the old buildings in New England cities and 
towns. The states can stimulate the rate at which the 
heating systems of these buildings are upgraded by pro­
viding incentives through loans, loan guarantees, or tax 
breaks for insulating and upgrading the heating systems
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INCENTIVES
FOR
UPGRADING
CURRENT
SYSTEMS
(continued)
STANDARDS FOR 
EXTERIOR 
LIGHTING
STANDARDS FOR 
INTERIOR 
LIGHTING: 
NEW
CONSTRUCTION
of current buildings. In addition, the states can fund, 
programs which utilize underemployed or unemployed con­
struction workers, and the management capability of 
viable but temporarily struggling construction firms, 
to improve where necessary the insulation qualities and 
heating systems of selected existing New England buildings.
ELECTRICITY
A. Exterior lighting, particularly in commercial districts, 
can consume large amounts of electricity with very little 
productive function performed. The states can initiate 
progress toward reducing unnecessary use of electricity 
for exterior lighting by establishing statewide standards 
for maximizing street lighting efficiency, for minimizing 
exterior lighting of buildings beyond that required 
for public safety, and for minimizing the use of 
electric signs and displays.
8. Interior lighting of nonresidential buildings is only 
infrequently designed to minimize the use of electricity 
without sacrificing illumination requirements. The 
states can cause a significant reduction in new demands 
for electricity by establishing statewide electricity 
use efficiency standards for interior illumination of 
commercial, industrial, and institutional buildings, 
and for the use of waste heat from lighting systems.
These standards could apply to all new buildings, and 
to additions to current structures.
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APPLIANCE
LABELING
INCENTIVES 
FOR PROCESS 
CHANGE
C. The proliferation of electric appliances is one of the 
most significant factors in the rapid growth in the de­
mand for electricity by the residential sector. Un­
fortunately, most consumers are not aware of the real 
cost of many energy intensive conveniences (e.g., self-) 
cleaning ovens). The states can help consumers to seek 
energy efficient appliances in their purchases by re­
quiring that all electric appliances sold in New England 
be labeled in such a manner as to inform the consumer 
of the efficiency and/or the electricity consumption per 
unit of operation of the appliance. In addition, any 
electrical equipment that includes a fast warm-up 
feature (and thus consumes electricity at times other 
than when in use) could be so labeled.
INDUSTRIAL AND UTILITIES PROCESS ENERGY
A. New England industry should be encouraged to use 
process energy as efficiently as possible. In some 
cases, however, a business may need to change its pro­
duction process in order to reduce its energy consumption 
per unit of output. This requires investment in capital 
equipment. Depending on the remaining useful life of 
existing equipment and the financial position of the 
business— this investment may be neither justifiable 
nor feasible. In such situations,^the states can provide 
financial incentives to industry to upgrade production
INCENTIVES 
FOR PROCESS 
CHANGE 
(continued)
MATERIALS
REUSE
CO-LOCATION
processes in order to conserve energy. Loans, loan 
guarantees, or tax incentives can be made available to 
small businesses for investments in industrial process 
changes that will substantially reduce direct process 
energy consumption. In addition, the states could pro­
vide technical assistance to businesses which are 
interested in improving their use of process energy.
B. Industry can contribute substantially to regional 
energy conservation by instituting improved methods 
for managing the residuals from production processes.
The states can focus attention on the energy savings 
associated with residuals management by helping 
industry to identify, capture, and reuse valuable 
materials from their collective waste streams, and by 
identifying opportunities for industry to share waste 
disposal facilities so that efficiencies of scale can 
be achieved. A program of information services and 
technical assistance to accomplish these purposes 
can be initiated, perhaps in conjunction with federal 
programs in water quality improvement.
C. The states can encourage co-location of industries 
which can operate symbiotically on a materials or 
energy basis, thus causing significant direct or in­
direct energy savings. Of particular importance is 
the reuse of waste heat from industrial processes and 
power generation, use of water from wastewater treat­
ment plants, and use of the materials and energy in 
municipal solid waste.
37
38
Supplemental Sources - New England has more indigenous sources of energy 
than are immediately apparent. That little has been done to utilize 
these sources is a reflection of the national syndrome to concentrate the 
pursuit of new energy supplies on large-scale technologies and on sources 
which are either controlled by today's energy industry or require massive 
amounts of capital from a few companies to develop. Excepting possible coal 
reserves, New England's energy sources do not (yet) provide the promise 
of base-load energy supply. And yet they do offer considerable opportunity 
to whittle away at the region's reliance on oil while (hopefully) technolo­
gists work on promising methods for replacing fossil fuels altogether.
What are the region's energy riches? Among others:
. Enough solar radiation to make it possible, with today's 
technology, to reliably satisfy 50-60 percent of the heating 
requirements of a typical house or low-rise office building.
. Some of the "best" (e.g. consistently neither too strong nor 
too gentle) winds in the country for powering windmill-based 
electric generators.
. Tides which cause water to flood into, and recede from, some
coastal areas at a rate which exceeds the flow of many rivers.
. Variation in ocean water temperatures (thermal gradients) 
which are sufficient for operating a heat engine (which can then 
generate electricity).
. Large volumes of municipal solid waste, each ton of which con­
tains almost 50 percent as much Btu value as coal.
. Large quantities of wood waste, much of which is currently 
discarded after milling or wood finishing, and some of 
which exists in the many unmanaged forests of the region.
Many of these sources of energy (particularly solar radiation, wind,
solid waste, and wood waste) can be exploited immediately as supplements
to the region's more traditional fuels. Existing technologies, though not
yet fully commercialized, are more than adequate for converting these
renewable or replenishable sources of energy into useful forms.
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The extent to which renewable forms of energy will be used as 
supplements to fossil fuels in New England depends upon many factors—  
the economics of the application; public actions regarding property 
taxation, building codes, and financing; policies of financial institutions; 
and prices and availabilities of fossil fuels— to name a few. However, 
the potential contribution of certain of the renewable fuel sources is 
significant enough to warrant a public effort to overcome some of the 
barriers to their utilization.
For example, it is estimated that if all the new residential and 
commercial buildings constructed in New England between 1980 and 1990 were 
to have supplemental solar heating systems, then by 1990 about 10 percent 
of the total energy demands of the residential and commercial sectors 
(or 5 percent of total regional energy input requirements) would be satisfied by 
the solar systems. Any retrofitting of the heating or hot water systems 
of existing structures would add to this amount.
Although it may seem optimistic to expect that solar heating systems 
will become standard installations in new buildings by 1980, it is likely 
that within the next five years commercialization and large scale production 
will bring their cost down and make such systems economically attractive.
At the same time, the price of other sources of energy will be increasing—  
thus potentially causing demands for solar systems to exceed expectations.
It is clearly in the best interest of New England to do whatever is 
reasonable and feasible to help make solar heating a viable alternative
*
Based on data developed by Arthur D. Little, Inc. for the New England 
Regional Commission.
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to completely fossil-fuel fired or electric systems. The fuel savings of 10 
percent in the residential and commercial sectors combined, which is 
roughly equivalent to 80,000 barrels per day of oil, is a significant 
addition to a comprehensive energy conservation program.
Another example of a supplementary source of energy which is 
awaiting exploitation is the combustible fraction of mixed municipal 
waste. It is now reasonably accepted that solid waste or refuse- 
derived fuel can be a primary fuel for generating steam, or can be used 
as a fuel supplement in electric utility boilers. If the combustible 
fraction of the solid waste generated by New England's largest metro­
politan areas (i.e., with populations over 100,000) were recovered and 
used by the region's utilities, the waste would satisfy over 5 percent 
of their fossil fuel demands. This would amount to slightly over 
1 percent of New England's total energy requirements.
Recovery of resources from solid waste is one of the few energy 
programs which has both substantial economic and environmental benefits. 
Diversion of waste from land disposal sites avoids the many environmental 
consequences which can occur as a result of landfilling (not to mention 
the problems of locating and acquiring acceptable sites for the land­
fills). And instead of paying to be rid of the waste, the market will 
pay to use it. This does not mean that communities will make money from 
selling their solid waste, or even that they will pay any less of a 
"dump fee". It does mean, however, that the waste will reenter the 
economic stream and, consequently, will make a contribution to the New 
England economy that would otherwise have been foregone.
New England has recognized these advantages of resource recovery.
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In Massachusetts, there are three recovery systems in operation (Saugus, 
East Bridgewater, and Braintree), and a number of others in planning. 
Connecticut, through the Connecticut Resources Recovery Authority, 
is planning a series of major recovery facilities. Rhode Island has 
recently formed a state authority to implement recovery projects.
It is estimated that over 50 percent of the region's metropolitan waste 
is in the process of being considered for some'form of energy recovery.
This represents over three times the level of activity for the rest 
of the country.
It is critical, at this juncture, to assure that these energy 
recovery projects continue to proceed toward operations at a rapid pace, 
and that unnecessary institutional or market barriers do not impede 
or prevent their successful implementation.
The mechanisms listed below can be used by the states of New 
England to encourage the prolification of energy production methods which 
do not result in depletion of scarce and nonreplenishable fuel sources.
If successful, the effort to develop supplemental sources will have 
a dual value to New England. First, by 1990 it is possible that 10 percent 
or more of the regions energy requirements could be satisfied by 
techniques such as solar heating, energy recovery from solid and wood 
waste,and wind-based power generators. LTn conjunction with demand 
management, therefore, this means that expected demands for fossil 
fuels (and, to a lesser extent, nuclear fuels) can be reduced by 
upwards of 30 percent by 1990. In so doing, New England will have 
reduced its incremental energy requirements (over 1974) from 60 percent 
to about 15 percent.
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The second value of a successful supplemental sources program 
is that progress on more sophisticated, and more significant, 
technologies for converting the various forms of solar energy into 
useful heat, electricity, or fuels will likely be accelerated. The 
primary stimulant to development will be a growing perception that 
New England is serious about using energy production technologies 
that are based on renewable fuel sources, and therefore that market 
opportunities are both real and lucrative.
A. One of the most important determinants for pro-
FINANCIAL liferation of systems which produce supplemental
INCENTIVES
fuel or energy from renewable resources is the 
financial viability of the individual projects 
or applications. The states and local communities 
can increase the attractiveness of systems such as 
solar heating and resource recovery by providing 
tax incentives through mechanisms such as property 
tax exemptions and accelerated depreciation allow­
ances. The states can also assist in the financing 
of the applications by working with existing 
financial institutions to assure the maximum availa­
bility of various debt financing methods to investors 
in the applications. In addition, the states could 
provide loans or loan guarantees directly in order to 
underwrite the installation of supplemental systems. 
(These mechanisms are discussed more fully in the section 
on energy industry development.)
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DEVELOPMENT
PUBLIC LEGAL.& 
ADMINISTRATIVE 
CONSTRAINTS
B. In some cases, e.g. solar heating and cooling systems, 
the cost of available systems is currently high 
because each system is a custom installation. Mass 
production, and standardization, of system components 
will result in significant reductions in cost and 
thus will increase their marketability. The states 
can accelerate the rate of progress toward mass 
produced systems or system modules by creating 
demand. This demand can be created by
requiring, in the solar heating example, that new 
state office buildings and schools install supple­
mental fuel systems. In the case of resource recovery, 
the state public utility commissions can establish 
guidelines for provisions for, and purchase of, supple­
mental refuse-derived fuels by electric utilities. In 
certain circumstances (where state funds are involved 
and feasibility is proven), the states can also stipu­
late the use of refuse-derived fuels by mass transit 
organizations which generate their own power, and by 
developers of office or industrial complexes which 
require substantial amounts of steam for space heating.
C. Sometimes the installation of supplemental fuel systems 
is constrained, rather than encouraged, by state or 
local statutes or administrative procedures. Building
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TECHNICAL
ASSISTANCE
AND
INFORMATION
DISSEMINATION
codes, zoning and other land use controls, and permit­
ting procedures should be scrutinized to ascertain 
that they do not act as impediments to solar heating, 
resource recovery, etc. In some cases, new statutes 
may be required that assure that the opportunity for 
installation of these systems is maximized (e.g. Florida's 
"right to sunlight" law). In other cases, waivers of 
the provisions of certain statutes may be necessary 
(e.g. certain of the competitive bidding requirements 
for public procurements).
D. The states can facilitate the successful application 
of supplemental fuel systems, and can improve the 
likelihood that they will receive serious consideration 
for application where feasible, by providing assistance 
to individuals and organizations who are (or could be) 
considering installation of such systems. The assis­
tance could range from the provision of direct advisory 
services to the maintenance of a technical information 
clearinghouse. One possibility for the clearinghouse 
concept is to provide a diagnostic and matching service 
through which an individual could determine the range of 
feasible supplemental fuel systems which could meet his 
needs. A list of New England-based organizations and 
New England-produced equipment.which,are available 
could also be produced.
45
Securing Supplies of Fossil Fuels
The energy conservation program can bring New England very close 
to a condition of zero growth in the consumption of scarce fossil fuels. 
This laudable achievement would do much to protect the region from future 
escalations in the price of fossil fuels and from the uncertain future 
supplies of oil and natural gas. Conservation does not, unfortunately, 
solve the region's energy security problems— it simply prevents their 
worsening. For even under the most optimistic conservation scenario,
New England will require, in 1990, at least as much gasoline, distillate 
and residual oils, and natural gas as it did in 1974.
Thus, until the region can avail itself of technologies which pro­
duce energy from renewable sources of fuel, it is necessary to continue a 
degree of reliance (albeit a lesser degree) on oil.* The program strategy 
is directed toward making this reality as manageable as possible, and 
especially to develop for New England a greater degree of influence over 
its sources of oil and gas.
Georges Bank Development** - Georges Bank, which lies about 30 to 200 miles 
offshore New England, is potentially one of the country's most signifi­
cant resource reserves:
. The Georges Bank fishery currently yields over 10 percent of 
the nation's fish landings. If all the fish caught on the Bank 
were landed in the United States, this percentage would increase 
to almost 25 percent.
* Later sections will address the contribution which coal and nuclear 
energy can make toward moving the region away from its oil base. The 
authors of this report tend to consider even coal and nuclear alternatives 
to be interim measures, i.e., technologies which fill the time gap between 
oil depletion and large-scale utilization of solar energy and/or hydrogen.
** Many of the data presented in this section are from the Arthur D. Little, 
Inc. report to the Energy Program of the New England Regional Commission 
entitled "Petroleum Development in New England" (April 1975).
The geological formation of the Bank may hold 5 percent or more of 
the country's recoverable oil reserves, as well as substantial 
volumes of natural gas.
However, whereas it is proven that Georges Bank can yield over a 
billion pounds of fish per year (year in and year out), its value as a 
source of oil or gas will not be known unitl exploration is completed. On the 
basis of known geological formations, experts have estimated that total 
recoverable Georges Bank hydrocarbons (crude oil plus associated gases) 
may amount to 8.9 billion barrels. In addition, there may exist approxi­
mately 29 trillion cubic feet of natural gas in Georges Bank gas fields.
At New England's 1974 levels of consumption, these reserves amount to 
approximately 15 years of oil and over 100 years of natural gas.* If these 
reserves are proven (and from 2 to 5 years are needed for exploration), 
it will take anywhere from 5 to 10 years before production of crude oil 
begins, i.e., the country will probably not have Georges Bank oil to 
refine until the mid 1980's.
From New England's viewpoint, Georges Bank is potentially the most 
secure source of oil and natural gas--if exploration proves developable 
quantities of either, or both, fuels. Except for the possible coal de­
posits in Southeastern Massachusetts and Rhode Island, it is closer to 
the most populated areas of the region than any other source of fossil 
fuels. Thus transportation penalties, such as the over $.50 per million 
Btu's which New England pays to bring natural gas from the Southwest 
(an amount which matches the wellhead price of the gas itself), will be 
reduced substantially. More importantly, the proximity of the
* These reserve lives are based on a simple ratio of recoverable reserves 
to New England demand. The high number for natural gas reflects the 
current minor amount of gas consumed in the region. In practice, de­
velopment of the oil and gas reserves will occur over roughly a 20 year 
period. Thus, much of the natural gas would likely be exported to other 
parts of the country unless there were reason and the will to keep it 
in the ground.
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source to the region will probably mean that New Englanders become in­
volved politically, economically, and socially in its development. This 
involvement will open up lines of communication with the energy industry 
which have not existed in the past. The states will develop a stake in 
the energy industry and the industry, in turn, will develop a stake in 
New England. This process can result in a greater degree of control for 
the region over its energy supply future.*
The chances are that there is either a developable quantity of gas
or oil in the Bank's geological formations, and that the first fuel that
is proven to be present in economic quantities will be the one developed.
If the amount of recoverable gas reserves under Georges Bank is somewhere 
near that which the experts are predicting, New England may find itself 
in the unusual position of having easy access to large quantities of natural 
gas. This possibility, the ramifications of which have yet to be explored, 
could have substantial implications in future regional industrial develop­
ment— especially development of industries that use methane as a feed­
stock as well as those that require natural gas for process energy.
Development of Georges Bank oil or gas has more impact on New
England than increasing the security of energy supply. There will be 
economic and environmental consequences as well. Like most large-scale 
developments, the impacts from producing oil or gas on Georges Bank are 
mixed and open td interpretation and argument by those who (rightfully)
* On the negative side, the process of increasing the region's involve­
ment with the energy industry can also result in a greater degree of 
control over the region's affairs by the energy industry. Which out­
come occurs will largely rest on the actions of the region's political 
leaders.
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add their values to the cold data of the analyst.
From an economic point of view, development of Georges Bank could 
result in anywhere from 5,000 to 12,000 new jobs. The degree to which 
these jobs will be filled from within the region depends largely on the 
amount of equipment fabrication and assembly conducted in New England, on 
the skill mix available at the time of development, on the degree to which 
training is provided to the New England labor force, and on the outcome 
of negotiations between regional public officials and the members of the 
energy industry.
In addition to jobs, development of Georges Bank will likely result 
in substantial revenues to the coastal states. The amount of these 
revenues will be determined on the basis of negotiations between the 
states and the federal government over the degree to which coastal areas 
should share in the revenues from the leasing of offshore land.
Georges Bank development also raises the possibility of a serious 
economic conflict. The New England fishing industry recently topped 
$100 million in fish landings. With the 200-mile resource zone established, 
the fishing industry can be expected to expand in its economic importance 
to New England. However, exploitation of Georges Bank for its energy re­
sources may seriously constrain the growth, or even threaten the viability, 
of one of the region's oldest and most productive industries. The conflicts 
between the two industries arise because of: (1) space competition— offshore 
due to the area taken up for drilling rigs, pipelines, undersea completions, 
etc., all of which interfere with bottom fishing; and onshore due to 
competition for dock space, support services, and parts; (2) the potential 
for marine life-damaging offshore oil spills; and (3) competition for 
skilled labor. Some individuals think that these conflicts can be
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minimized if someone is able to persuade the two industries to 
cooperate within a management scheme which allows each to benefit 
without overly taxing either.
The environmental impacts of offshore oil or gas development are 
difficult to assess without better information on the amount and 
location of the reserves. However, the risks of chronic small oil 
spills or infrequent large ones, and their negative impact on the 
marine ecosystem are high enough to warrant concern by a region which 
appreciates the intrinsic value of the sea and the coastal zone.
Many analysts believe, however, that the risk of a spill from offshore 
drilling and oil production is less than from the current traffic of 
small oil-laden tankers moving into New England harbors.
In addition to spills, offshore production of oil may cause con­
siderable shoreside development. If poorly controlled, this development 
would reduce the environmental quality of certain of the region's coastal 
areas.
Overall, production of oil or gas from Georges Bank could be very 
beneficial to New England--particularly if the health and vitality of 
the region's fishing industry can be preserved, and if the environmental 
quality of New England's coastal zone can be maintained. Listed below 
are some mechanisms which can be used to encourage prudent development 
of Georges Bank and to assure participation of New England in the reaping 
of the fruits of this development.
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INTERSTATE
COOPERATION
A. Although prior determination of Georges Bank re­
serves would much simplify and improve planning 
for related petroleum development, national objec­
tives will not forgive the added time necessary to 
thoroughly determine the resource base. As it is, 
Georges Bank is under federal control and all de­
cisions relating to the area are under federal 
jurisdiction. However, the contiguous coastal 
states could establish a system whereby they will 
cooperate in the planning for potential shoreside 
development and will not be induced to compete for 
revenue-producing facilities by lowering environ­
mental standards. Interstate consultation through 
NERCOM or some other regional body should be used 
to avoid damaging interstate conflicts.
The states could take steps to coordinate their 
coastal zone management (CZM) programs so as to 
achieve site pre-designation and reduce the general 
parameters the federal law requires vis-a-vis con­
sideration of facilities in the national interest. 
Site pre-designation would allow the states to en­
courage development in areas chosen by the states, 
not the developer; would allow for more specific 
CZM planning and drive to federal acceptance of 
each state's CZM program; and would prevent facility
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COOPERATION
(continued)
JOB
TRAINING
establishment according to a "most regulations 
overlooked" competition amonq the states.
Further, the states could support a regional council 
responsible for OCS information gathering and dis­
semination so as to: (a) simplify communications 
among the federal government, developers, and state 
governments; (b) provide baseline data that can be 
the grounds for coordinated interstate decisions;
(c) serve as a conduit for decision making for all 
interested parties; and (d) develop state expertise 
in impact assessment.
B. The exploration process and, clearly, the production 
phase of OCS development will require many skilled 
laborers; including welders, pipe-fitters, adminis­
trators, work boat crews, construction labor, and 
maintenance labor. Unless the region takes steps now 
to train local citizens for these skills, labor is 
quite likely to be imported. Service costs (such 
as those associated with housing, education, and 
wastewater treatment) to communities which host in­
migrants but still carry heavy rolls of unemployed 
persons will rise at a time when these costs can be 
least afforded. The region should develop and en­
hance curricula at New England trade schools and 
universities so as to create a labor force that will 
be able to meet the employment demands of OCS
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ENVIRONMENTAL
QUALITY
activity. Negotiations with developers may release 
private capital for this training, although the need 
is pressing enough to demand a restructuring of current 
course schedules and a commitment of public resources.
C. The region must establish consistent and enforce­
able criteria so as to maintain the character of the 
valuable coastline as well as to provide restrictions 
that will enhance and maintain a potentially competing 
use of the Bank--fisheries. The states have the 
power, especially through their CZM programs and 
various siting-related regulations, to control or 
direct shoreside development so as to manage and pro­
tect the valuable and fragile coastal resources. The 
federal government has the authority to include what­
ever stipulations it feels are necessary to allow 
fisheries to coexist with OCS oil development.
Ideally, such stipulations should be identified 
before lease sale, allowing bidders to discount 
possible increased costs to achieve those stipu­
lations. In a sense, then, federal revenues de­
crease and the national public subsidizes OCS protein 
production. Stipulations should include a require­
ment for pipeline burial, traffic lanes for service 
vessels, navigation aids on platforms, development 
of a full liability structure, and, where possible,
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PROTEIN 
VERSUS OIL 
PRODUCTION
staged development of those areas in direct con­
flict with prime fishing grounds.
D. A major renewable resource for New England lies 
just offshore--the Georges Bank fishery. At present, 
the Bank lies under international control and the 
majority of the fish captured are taken by foreign 
distant-water fleets. The area, however, could pro­
vide over 25 percent of domestic fisheries production 
and consequently represents an enormously valuable 
resource for the region— both in terms of developing 
indigenous employment as well as providing an export 
item that is soon to have major worldwide importance 
as food crises intensify. Fisheries production from 
Georges Bank also represents a tremendous monetary 
value which will increase substantially once the 
200-mile resource zone is implemented. With sound 
management, the longevity of the resource rivals 
any other use of the OCS and argues for coexistence, 
not competition,between oil and fish production.
The region should, then, continue to press for 
intelligent implementation of the 200-mile United 
States resource zone off the New England coast.
As the legislation leaves fisheries management to 
regional councils, the region should prepare a
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PROTEIN development plan that can serve as the foundation for
VERSUS OIL
PRODUCTION negotiations with federal agencies, the oil industry,
(continued)
and the fishing industry regarding establishment of a 
system for managing the Bank's dual resources. The 
plan should also define a process for achieving inter- 
and intra-industry cooperation in offshore operations 
and onshore operations and development. The planning 
process could be facilitated if data are developed 
which allow planners to:
- Make a determination of the oil-fisheries physical 
competition in order to assess the time lost, pro­
duction effects, and operating costs under various 
development patterns. Vessel traffic, exploratory 
rig location, pipeline location (including costs of 
burial), production platform location, debris treat­
ment, labor transfer, and onshore effects in terms 
of wharfage, fuel parts, and maintenance are among 
the more important factors.
- Identify, from the information developed, which federal 
OCS stipulations are required. A priority list of such 
stipulations can then be developed, and pressure could 
be exerted through the New England Congressional Dele-r 
gation and individual state actions to ensure that 
such stipulations are adopted. Stipulations must be 
announced before tract sale and, consequently, this
is an immediate issue.
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PROTEIN 
VERSUS OIL 
PRODUCTION 
(continued)
- Determine which fisheries infrastructure is most 
suitable for coexistence with the oil industry 
and provides the most employment without reducing 
production, paying attention to energy costs, 
technological assessment of processing and 
distribution, and the economic parameters of a 
high employment infrastructure.
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Petroleum Facilities* - New England currently has no petroleum refining 
capability; all of the oil products that are consumed come from refineries 
in the Middle Atlantic states, the Southwest, or foreign countries. The 
primary reason for this lack of refining capacity is that the major oil 
companies simply have not had sufficient reasons to invest in new capa­
city in New England as opposed, for example, to investing in expansion 
of existing capacity elsewhere in the country. Although many independents 
have shown an interest in building a New England refinery, the combination 
of poor public relations, insufficient planning, opposition from environ­
mentalists, uncertain financing, and inadequate guarantees of crude oil 
has been deadly to each proposed venture.
It is not that the New England market cannot support one, or two, 
or even three refineries— the Boston, Providence, New Haven, and 
Portsmouth/Portland demand areas are more than adequate markets for 
typical modern refining and distribution activities. Without a reliable 
and preferably close supply of crude oil, however, it is unlikely that 
the region will witness any significant amount of petroleum facility 
development in the foreseeable future, if ever.
Why, then, should New England concern itself with the refinery 
question? There are at least four reasons. First, if Georges Bank 
proves to contain developable amounts of oil, the entire outlook for 
New England-based refining capacity could change dramatically. Thus, 
the region should begin to prepare for such a possibility. Second, 
it may be feasible to make some rather creative arrangements for
* Many of the data presented in this section are from the Arthur D. Little, 
Inc. report to the Energy Program of the New England Regional Commission 
entitled "Petroleum Development in New England" (April 1975).
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reliably bringing crude oil into New England. A reliable source of crude 
could cause investments in New England refining capacity to be attractive 
Third, the states will, from time to time, need to respond to the 
proposals of entrepreneurs who may be able to put all the pieces 
together to build a New England refinery. It behooves the region to 
help these entrepreneurs to do a good job in organizing and designing 
their projects. Finally, it may be in the best interest of New England 
to refine at least some of its oil products within the region rather 
than to import them from other regions or countries. This is parti­
cularly true for the more essential fuels— residual and distillate oils.
Research has shown that properly designed and sited New England 
refineries will contribute significantly to the economics of the areas 
near them, and that the environmental impacts from construction and 
operation need not be severe. For example, refining operations could 
generate anywhere from 1500 to 8000 new jobs, depending on the size 
of the refineries. With proper training, upwards of 90 percent of 
these new jobs could be filled by members of the New England labor force. 
In addition, each 250,000 barrels per day refining could contribute 
upwards of $20 million per year in state and local tax revenues. 
Installation of a petrochemical complex in conjunction with refining 
operations could add over 1500 new jobs and $10 million per year in tax 
revenues. Furthermore, production of petrochemicals in New England 
could have a substantial multiplier effect on industrial development.
The environmental consequences of refining are closely tied to the 
siting of the facility and the control of land use around it.* The
* Analysis has shown that a refinery need not be located on the coast.
The additional cost incurred by locating the facility 25 miles 
inland amounts to somewhere around 1/4 cent per gallon of final product
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enormous supply of water needed for refining operations requires that a 
facility be located on a major water body. Economics dictate a location 
near a major market area. Thus, in New England a refinery would have to 
be sited on the coast, or on either the Connecticut, Merrimack, Andros­
coggin, or Kennebec Rivers. Use of advanced pollution control technology 
will not completely eliminate pollutants in the water discharges of re­
fineries; however, in combination with location on a large flowing river, 
control technology can mitigate against environmental damage from the 
remaining pollutants. The most severe and difficult to control pollutant 
from refinery operations is hydrocarbon emissions to the atmosphere. Al­
though some refinery designers claim that in Europe, for example, refineries 
are being build with little or no detectable hydrocarbon emissions, it seems 
reasonable to assume that until improved control techniques are demonstrated, 
a refinery in New England will frequently violate current ambient air 
quality standards for total hydrocarbons. Thus, is is possible that EPA 
could deny a new refinery its permit to operate.
There is insufficient evidence showing that spills of crude oil 
are less damaging to the environment than spills of oil products. Thus, 
delivery of crude to New England for refining probably is only mar­
ginally "better" than delivery of final product. It is true, however, 
that a system of crude delivery by very large tankers to a deepwater 
terminal could reduce the chronic spillage associated with the current 
system of small tankers off-loading product in New England's shallow ports.
A fixed or floating deepwater terminal for receipt of crude oil (probably 
from foreign sources) makes sense for the region if it is conceived as
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part of a total time-phased system of petroleum acquisition, processing, 
and distribution. The possibility of crude production from Georges 
Bank looms as the most significant, and uncertain, deterrent to a 
deepwater terminal. For the terminal may be quickly obsoleted by 
development of oil on the Bank.*
Whether or not refining facilities are built in New England, it is 
important that the region has adequate storage capacity for essential 
fuels such as residual and distillate fuel oils. The current capacity 
to carry from 20 to 25 days of inventory is not sufficient protection 
against the risk of disruptions in the supply of petroleum products.
A doubling of storage capacity would not be unreasonable, for it would 
provide enough time for emergency measures, such as reallocation of 
domestic refinery output, to be put into effect.** Industry, however, 
has not been anxious to increase product storage capacity. Land for 
tank farms is scarce, and there is little (if any) financial incentive 
for the oil companies to invest scarce capital in essentially nonproductive 
contingency facilities.
* Even with crude oil coining into New England by pipeline from Georges 
Bank, it may be possible to utilize a deepwater terminal for other purposes, 
including receipt of oil products or other liquid materials. To date, 
this possibility has not been explored sufficiently.
** It is interesting to note that a typical refinery carries about 45 days 
of crude storage. Thus, each New England refinery would add substantially 
to the region's ability to survive a short-term supply crisis.
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The NERCOM report on petroleum development summarizes the value of
New England refining capacity when it states (the parenthetical phrases
are added by the authors of this report):
"...Given the present state of U. S. (crude oil) 
production and an expected future need to continue 
to use foreign crude oil supplies, the establishment 
of a truly secure supply can only occur with United States 
based production...Thus the OCS potential on Georges Bank 
offers the greatest regional chance for improved supply 
security...Without an increase in United States production 
(if crude oil), a regional refinery based on foreign crude 
offers a modest improvement in supply security simply 
because the refinery is regionally located and the operator 
has a strong financial incentive to keep it supplied with 
feedstock 'V
Thus, whereas New England may highly favor (under proper management) 
regional-based production and refining of Georges Bank oil and increases 
in the capacity for storing petroleum products, the question of the 
desirability of refining capacity and, possibly, a deepwater terminal 
based on foreign crude is one which can be answered only on a case- 
by-case basis.
Listed below are mechanisms which the region can use to help for­
mulate petroleum facility development programs.
DEEPWATER
TERMINAL
PROPOSALS
SUPPORT
OF
REFINERY
AND
A. The region should support and assist the efforts of 
any of the various states, or individual entrepreneurs, 
to attract and site an inland oil refinery that meets 
accepted environmental standards and for which there 
are reasonable assurances that financing is available 
and that a reliable supply of crude oil can be arranged. 
A plan should be developed by the potential refiner, in 
conjunction with state and/or regional public bodies, 
for securing crude oil from potential Georges Bank pro-
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(continued)
ducers in sufficient quantities to support refinery 
operations.
The refinery should be designed to produce a high 
fuel oil products slate initially, with plans to 
produce maximum gasoline and to add a petrochemical 
complex at a later time. Here, also, interstate co­
operation is necessary so as to maximize revenues, 
facilitate CZM planning, and design the best regional 
product mix.
To foster and promote petroleum facilities in New 
England--supported by crude from Georges Bank and/or 
tanker delivery to shoreside or deepwater terminals—  
wiMt require provisions for action orientation at 
the regional (and, therefore, individual state) level. 
Capability to support petroleum facility development 
is explicitly linked to government's ability to take 
the initiative. LegaT, institutional^ and economic 
development mechanisms need to be formulated and 
implemented to afford the region and the states 
capability to serve as catalysts for oil-related 
resource development. A regional entity should take 
the initiative to provide a service to the states in 
two key functional areas: energy information and
technical assistance.
-Integrated Information Services can provide a basis 
upon which state level decision makers can proceed 
with positive governmental actions on those issues 
that extend beyond state boundaries. Issues of multi-
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state interest associated with petroleum development 
include: CZM planning, environmental/economic impact
statements, and social service demands that cross 
state lines. These issues must be addressed from a 
position of strength and capability to formulate 
solutions equitable to a majority of those concerned.
The regional entity would gather, analyze, and dis­
tribute petroleum development-related information, 
studies, reports (gathered from federal, interstate, 
state, local, and private sectors) to state and local 
level decision makers with analysis and recommendations 
that emphasize interstate concerns. The use of a 
common information system by individual states will 
promote understanding and cooperation toward the 
equitable siting of petroleum development facilities. 
Technical Assistance and Advice can synthesize and 
prioritize the bulk of regional technical information 
into suitable baseline data sets for petroleum develop­
ment decision making. A technical staff composed of 
representatives from the industrial development, govern­
mental, and related resource use sectors can address 
legal/institutional, petroleum development, environmental, 
etc. issues so as to provide an interstate implementation 
strategy. A combination of an integrated and credible 
information base with technical assistance and advice 
will promote bi- and/or multi-state decisions con­
cerning petroleum facility development and promote 
them in a manner so as to maintain environmental
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controls, land/water use restrictions, and the tradi- 
tional protections of the public's health and welfare.
B. To reduce vulnerability, incentives for the oil industry 
to increase the storage capacity for residual and 
distillate oils to a minimum of 40 days should be 
investigated. Current federal price control regula­
tions Should be relaxed to permit: (a) inventorying
of fuel oils during seasons in which prices are lower 
and (b) sale at relatively higher peak-season prices. 
Accelerated depreciation of new storage facilities 
also should be allowed by the federal and state 
governments. An effort to identify sites should be 
undertaken now; consultation with industry representa­
tives should be initiated.
The design, siting, and construction of product pipe­
lines from refineries and/or product storage areas 
to major distribution or consumption centers also can 
be facilitated. This will reduce significantly the 
environmental and safety hazards associated with 
product-carrying tanker distribution systems.
C. Every effort should be made to provide employment 
opportunities for regional inhabitants in the event 
of petroleum facility development. Educational pro­
grams fostered at the state level will reduce the 
possibility of labor import into the region.
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D. A refinery is estimated to require 1000 acres of land. 
Site predesignation by the states will facilitate the 
location of energy facilities, minimize the negative 
impacts of their location, reduce the co>ts and delays 
associated with current procedures of siting, and 
indicate to developers the commitment of the region 
to foster facility siting within New England. A drive 
toward sensible petroleum facility siting and develop­
ment could include:
- Coordination with ongoing efforts, especially those 
directed towards developing criteria to be used by 
states in selecting sites for energy facilities.
- Technical assistance provided to the states for site 
definition.
- Development of a regional environmental impact state­
ment for sites recommended by the states. Those sites 
where interstate impacts can be expected should be 
noted, as should mechanisms for the amelioration of 
those impacts. This will allow for selection of the 
most suitable sites for development.
- Preparation of programs for acquiring options on 
land for facilities sites.
- Preparation of promotional literature to advertise 
the availability of publicly approved sites.
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Natural Gas* - Although natural gas consumption per capita is lower in 
New England than in any other region of the country, the region cannot 
afford to ignore the serious problems which are occurring in the availa­
bility of traditional domestic gas supplies. Approximately 40 percent of 
New England's households are customers of natural gas distribution com- S 
panies. Of these, over 50 percent (approximately 800,000 customers) use 
gas for space heating, the remainder use it for cooking and for appliances 
such as clothes dryers. Whereas only about 25 percent of the nation's 
natural gas is consumed, on the average, by the residential sector, in 
New England the residential sector accounts for over 50 percent of the 
region's consumption of gas. This statistic is a double-edged sword. 
Federal Power Commission gas curtailment policy is currently based on 
prioritization of consumer classes rather than on proportional cutbacks. 
With residential consumption receiving the highest priority, and because 
of the region's consumption profile, New England stands to suffer the 
least cutback in its gas supplies. However, if shortages reach the pro­
portions which many experts are predicting, then New England households 
may be proportionately harder hit than in any other region.
New England's distance from its sources of gas, and its expensive 
distribution system (very little of the fixed cost of local distribution 
and service is absorbed by large industrial users, because there are very 
few large industrial users) have resulted in regional gas prices which 
for residential customers are 82 percent higher than the national average 
and almost twice as high as those paid by households in the East North
* Much of the data presented in this section are from the report by the 
Institute of Gas Technology for the Energy Program of the New England 
Regional Commission entitled "Gas Industry Development in New England" 
(June 1975).
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Central states. Similarly, New England industry pays 156 percent more 
for its natural gas than does the average United States industrial firm. 
These high prices have probably been the primary reason for the region's 
reasonably efficient use of natural gas— very little of this valuable 
fuel is wasted on such unfitting uses as the firing of utility boilers.* 
Very little can be done to reduce the price paid by the region for 
its gas. However, New England can take steps to assure that supplies 
of natural gas will not fall short of those required. The region's 
security of supply will be maximized if Georges Bank gas fields are 
proven and developed. This possibility alone justifies a reasonable 
effort to maintain the region's existing gas industry and the distribution 
infrastructure. Without a major find of gas fields on Georges Bank, New 
England must rely on three methods for protecting against dwindling 
supplies of natural gas: (1) increased development of other domestic
sources of traditional natural gas; (2) development of programs to in­
crease supplemental gas supplies from imported LNG (liquefied natural 
gas) or from synthetic natural gas (SNG); and (3) maintenance of a program 
which assures New England an equitable allocation of available domestic 
pipeline gas.
It is estimated that upwards of 40 percent of New England's natural 
gas requirements could be met by LNG, and that an additional 30 percent 
or so could be met by SNG produced from naphtha and coal. In combination 
with anticipated availability of domestic gas, these amounts would be 
sufficient, under conditions of maximum conservation, to avoid serious
* The "best" use of natural gas is as a feedstock for chemical production. 
A "very good" use is for functions that require relatively high tempera­
tures and clean and even burning, such as cooking. A "poor" use is for 
large-scale stationary sources that easily can use fuels of lesser 
qua!ity.
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shortages of gas to New England's consumers over the next fifteen years.
The mechanisms listed below can be used by New England in developing 
an agressive program to prevent a serious gas supply problem.
A. The relatively low price of natural gas acts as a 
deterrent to the substantial investments required
PRICE *
DEREGULATION for new exploration and development. In order to
provide industry with an incentive to increase the 
supply of traditional domestic pipeline gas, the 
region could support deregulation of the price of 
new gas, i.e. of the gas resulting from new wells. 
Before announcing firm support for one or more of 
the possible deregulation schemes, however, the 
region should explore in depth the time-phased 
impacts on New England of various forms of price 
decontrol--including phased, partial, selective, and 
blanket programs.
B. The importance of supplemental gas supplies to the
SUPPLEMENTAL region is clear. Over the next decade, New England
SUPPLIES
must turn to imported LNG, and to synthetic gas from 
coal or petroleum feedstocks to satisfy its require­
ments for natural gas. The region can facilitate the
* For an excellent discussion of deregulation, see Part 4 of the report to 
NERCOM by the Institute of Gas Technology entitled "Gas Industry De­
velopment in New England" (June 1975).
68
SUPPLEMENTAL
SUPPLIES
(continued)
ALLOCATION
OF
DOMESTIC
GAS
OCS GAS
importation of LNG by supporting the gas industry in 
its attempts to achieve Federal Power Commission 
approvals of their import applications. The region 
can also encourage (through political assistance, 
direct investments, or ERDA-funded joint ventures 
with the gas utilities) one or more projects for the 
gasification of ex-regional or regional coal. The 
major obstacle to such a program is gaining assurances 
that the resultant gas is transmitted to New England 
via existing pipelines without unneccessary imposition 
of constraints by the FPC.
C. As domestic supplies of natural gas continue to decline, 
the FPC, on its own or under pressure from Congress, 
can be expected to experiment with various forms of 
curtailment plans. New England should not only be 
fully cognizant of any new developments regarding 
curtailment, but it should also be well informed on the 
status of gas supply and demand in the region and in 
other regions, and should aggressively promote and 
argue plans which provide, equitably, for New England's 
needs. This is perhaps the most critical short-term 
supply-related requirement from those who assume 
responsibility for energy management in the region.
D. New England, as the closest land mass to Georges Bank, 
should encourage industry to assure that adequate and
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appropriate facilities for bringing natural gas into 
New England can be sited and developed in a timely 
manner. In addition, the gas industry should be en­
couraged to have adequate facilities in place for the 
liquefaction and storage in New England of OCS gas 
during off-peak seasons. These facilities could also 
be used for storing domestic pipeline gas. The region 
should determine the FPC position on such storage, and 
negotiate, if necessary, for FPC concurrence with a 
plan which benefits New England and which makes sense 
to the gas developers. Furthermore, it behooves the 
region to start considering the industrial development 
implications of abundant and close gas supplies.
Planned use of this potential gas for purposes which 
are sound from both a resource management and economic 
point of view will increase the likelihood that New 
England will receive multiple benefits from exploitation 
of Georges Bank.
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Coal Development - Over 25 percent of New England's power generating 
capacity was either designed to burn coal (if necessary) or has burned 
coal sometime during its operating lifetime. By 1974, however, less 
than 5 percent of the region's electricity was generated from coal. In 
response to air quality regulations, by the early 1970's most utilities 
had opted to burn oil so as to reduce particulate emissions. Thus, 
whereas in 1966 almost 11 million tons of coal were used in New England, by 
1974 regional consumption was under 2.5 million tons--a decline of over 75 
percent. As recently as 1970, over 70 percent more coal was brought into 
New England than in 1974.
Coal is the only fossil fuel which may exist in quantity within New 
England's boundaries. It is also the only domestic fuel source which 
is known to exist in sufficient enough quantities that its depletion will 
not be an issue during this century. Thus, coal might appear to be the 
solution to the fuel quandary. The coal solution, however, is costly.
Areas which are rich in surface coal are hesitant to permit massive 
stripping of their land and the devastation of fragile and ancient eco­
systems which occasionally occurs as a result of strip mining. Deep- 
mined coal can be less risky environmentally, but the impact on miner's 
health has been more costly than even available health statistics show.* 
Because of its bulk, coal is also very costly to transport, store, and 
handle. Finally, the burning of coal results in large amounts of air 
pollutants and enormous quantities of bottom ash, which must be disposed 
of in an environmentally sound manner. A 1,000 megawatt coal-burning
* It has been reported that the amount of insurance claims for treatment of 
"black lung disease" amounts to a cost that is roughly equivalent to $4.00 
per ton of coal mined. The significance of this cost is dramatized when 
one considers that the average U. S. price of coal in 1974 was only about 
$12.00 per ton.
71
power plant, for example, generates somewhere around 490,000 tons of 
ash per year— which over 20 years will result in a pile 40 feet deep 
over 95 acres.
Many of the transportation and user problems which affect the 
attractiveness of coal can be reduced or eliminated if the coal is 
gasified at or near the mine. The resultant gas (mostly methane) can 
be fed into existing natural gas transmission pipelines. Gasification, 
however, is also costly: (a) compared to the "raw" coal, the resultant
gas may cost two or three times as much per million Btu's; and (b) 
gasification results in the consumption of anywhere from almost two to 
almost three times as much coal per million Btu's of delivered fuel than 
do deep mining or strip mining without gasification.* Proposals have 
also been put fourth to transport coal in a slurry via pipeline to 
distant demand areas. The coal could then be used as is, or it could be 
gasified. This alternative is also costly, especially because of the 
investment required for the slurry pipelines, pumping stations, and 
processing equipment at destination points.
These problems are particularly real for New England— over the last 
decade, the region's coal handling equipment has been dismantled, and 
the region's railroads and rail beds have declined to the point where it 
is no longer possible (without substantial capital investment) to bring 
coal into the region in any quantity. Similarly, most of New England's 
electric utilities are unprepared to receive coal and to dispose of the 
ash residues.
* For additional information on the energy efficiencies and subsidies 
associated with various energy production technologies, see the report 
to the U. S. Department of the Interior by Development Sciences Inc. 
entitled "A Study to Develop Energy Estimates of Merit for Selected 
Fuel Technologies" (September 1975).
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New England may have its own supply of coal. The Narraganset Basin, 
which includes parts of Southeastern Massachusetts and Rhode Island, may 
contain large amounts of high quality coal. Until the reserves are proven, 
however, it is no more certain that this coal is developable than it is 
that Georges Bank oil is developable. Thus, a strategy which relies on 
a supply of indigenous coal would be irresponsible. Even if Narraganset 
coal is developable, the region will have to do a careful analysis of the 
impacts of mining and processing on the critical environmental and water 
resources of that part of New England so that conscientious decisions 
can be made on how development should occur and on the tradeoffs associated 
with various levels and forms of development.
Despite the enormous costs associated with the mining, processing, 
and consumption of coal, it is irrefutable that it represents one of the 
most secure supplies of fossil fuels available to New England. The region 
cannot afford to not make a concerted effort to determine how some of the 
problems associated with coal can be solved. Indeed, the challenge is to 
convert some of these problems into opportunities. The mechanisms 
suggested below may help formulate a program toward these ends.
A. The possibility that coal reserves exist in the Narra-
INDIGENOUS gansett Basin offer New England with a potential oppor-
COAL
RESERVES tunity to supply regional utilities with a secure fuel
source to replace some of its dependence on imported 
residual oil. It also offers a potential opportunity 
to produce rather large amounts of synthetic natural 
gas for residential and industrial uses. The coal,
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however, is likely to require deep mining, and lies 
under land the ownership of which is highly fragmented 
and which is in some places highly developed for urban 
functions. Thus, in addition to the environmental 
and economic tradeoffs which must be understood, the 
region will also need to address some extremely intri­
cate legal and institutional problems. For now, New 
England should support the effort to determine the 
extent, quality, and location of potential coal reserves. 
Once this information is in hand (and assuming it 
indicates a considerable and developable reserve), a 
comprehensive work program should be implemented to 
determine alternative development strategies (including 
alternative uses of the coal) and their consequences 
to the region, the individual states, and the involved 
local communities.
COAL
IMPORTATION
Before the region does anything to increase the avail­
ability of coal to New England's utilities, and before 
actions are taken to improve the coal transportation, 
handling, and storage infrastructure, it is critical 
to determine whether or not the region wants to encourage 
an increased use of coal. This is both a question of 
economics and environmental quality. If the answer to 
this question is positive, then New England must deter­
mine what investments are required by whom in order to
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again bring quantities of coal into the region by rail 
or barge. Once these investments are determined, the 
states can define methods for their financing, including 
securing funding from federal sources. Additionally, 
the states may find it attractive to enter into formal 
agreements with coal-producing states for joint develop­
ment (perhaps in conjunction with a group of utility 
companies) of new mines. The mining process could then 
be designed so as to maximize the protection of the 
miners' health and of the host state's natural environ­
ment.
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Trade Arrangements - The world's oil producing and exporting countries are 
beginning to realize that the enormous flow of foreign currency into their 
economies as payment for their crude oil can cause substantial internal 
problems relating to the distribution of this new wealth, the investment 
of the accumulated capital, and the balancing of physical, economic, and 
human development. At the same time, some oil exporting countries are 
concerned about the declining values of oil importers' currencies. More 
importantly, there is a recognition by some of the exporting countries 
that they must avoid causing serious damage to the economies of the nations 
which must buy their oil. Furthermore, some of the exporting countries 
also recognize that the lifetime of their oil reserves is limited, and 
that they must begin soon to develop or acquire alternative methods for 
satisfying their own energy requirements after the oil is gone and once 
they, too, need to fuel the forces of industrialization and economic 
growth.
Complicating some of these already difficult economic problems is the 
growing awareness by developing countries that the quality of their futures 
may be constrained by inadequate indigenous supplies of, or access to, 
protein sources.
The United States, on the other hand, is handsomely stocked with the 
planning and management expertise, the know-how to design and deliver 
health and educational services, the technological capability, the food 
resources, and many of the consumer and industrial goods which are 
critically needed by the developing oil exporting countries. Indeed, in 
many ways, New England has more than its share of this national stock of 
these needed goods and services. At the same time, New England needs to
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import oil or oil products in order to sustain its economic functions.
New England is also in need of new markets for its goods and services.
It is reasonably apparent that there exists an opportunity to create 
a relationship between New England and the oil exporting nations which 
satisfies the needs of both the oil producers and the oil consumers 
better than the current method of exchanging currency for oil. Two-way 
exchanges of resources could very well prove to be better for oil exporters 
because some of the short- and long-term economic instabilities triggered 
by an over-abundance of cash could be avoided. The two-way exchange can 
be better for New England because the reliability of oil supply could be
increased and because the economy of the region could be benefited.
There are two possible levels of involvement of the region in.the ex­
change of goods and services for foreign oil. The first is to "pay" for
oil with the outputs of New England-based organizations. The second is 
for New England to organize goods and services from many areas of the 
country in exchange for the oil. The best level of involvement is probably 
a combination of the producer and brokerage functions. The following 
paragraphs summarize some of the mechanisms which might be used to 
initiate this type of program.
A. Establishment of a private "trading company"
PUBLIC represents a highly sophisticated (not to mention
INVOLVEMENT
complex and complicated) development of the industrial 
trade missions established by New England. Public 
participation in the establishment of such a company 
appears essential on two counts. First, many producer 
countries are growing increasingly suspect and distrustful
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of contracting directly with private companies. Repre­
sentation of the New England states in negotiations 
could provide a mediator and brokerage function as 
well as offering the kind of confidence desired by 
foreign governments in undertaking contract negotiations 
with United States companies. Second, participation 
by the New England states would provide them with the 
knowledge and confidence needed regarding oil supplies 
for the region over the near term in order to vigorously 
implement energy policies. Moreover, public involve­
ment could provide for participation in overseas markets 
by highly capable smaller New England companies who 
otherwise might not have access to such opportunities. 
More importantly, public participation could assist and 
stimulate the private sector to organize and sell over­
seas on a broad and diversified scale that would be 
otherwise unattainable. The resultant economic stimulus 
would redound not only to the private sector, but to 
the region's residents and state and local governments 
as well. Such an approach also would show the private 
sector in and out of New England that the state govern­
ments are serious about economically revitalizing the 
region.
B. Because the trading company concept is highly sophisti­
cated and complex, involving national as well as regional 
considerations, a small private and public exploratory
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task force could be convened. This task force should, 
among other things: identify the specific markets in
various producer countries for the goods and services 
that could be supplied by New England firms; develop, 
on a preliminary basis, feasible and practical organi­
zational, legal, and financial arrangements and exchange 
procedures; and explore the receptivity to the concept 
by New England firms, the State Department, the World 
Bank, and key foreign administrators. Should the task 
force report favorably, then full-scale organizing 
could proceed. Even if the overall concept is found 
wanting, much of the information assembled should prove 
highly useful to many of the region's companies.
*Management of Electric Power
There are currently about 150 electric utilities in New England.
However, almost 70 percent of the total generating capacity is owned by 
five systems, four of which are holding companies comprised of several 
separate companies. Over 98 percent of the generating capability of 
the region is owned by twelve systems. Furthermore, all of the major 
utilities of New England are physically linked by a regional high voltage 
transmission system which, in addition to the interconnections within 
the region, is also connected in the west with the major transmission 
systems of New York and in the north with Canadian systems. Thus, New 
England's electricity is controlled by a few large companies which, though 
organizationally separate, are inextricably inter-linked by transmission 
1i nes.
Organizational cooperation among most of the region's utilities 
occurs through the New England Power Pool (NEP00L). Formed in 1971, NEP00L 
and its operations and planning arms--the New England Power Exchange (NEPEX), 
and NEPLAN— provides member utilities with centralized load dispatching and 
with the capacity to carry out joint and cooperative planning. In effect 
then,the utilities of New England have the flexibility to act in concert 
(through NEP00L) on matters which require common and consistent decisions, 
and to act independently on matters which are of concern only to the 
individual companies.
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Many of the data presented in this section are derived from reports by 
Booz, Allen & Hamilton, Inc. for the Energy Program of the New England 
Regional Commission.
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These organizational characteristics, most of which require considerable 
analysis in order to appreciate the importance of some of the subtleties, 
are critical factors in regional power management. Until recently, 
public sector involvement with the utilities has been limited to the 
control and regulatory roles of the state public utility commissions and 
environmental agencies, the Federal Power Commission, and the Nuclear 
Regulatory Commission. With expanded involvement through, for example, 
increased public authority in facility siting, the public sector is gradually 
approaching a position of sharing power management responsibilities with 
the utilities. Therefore, the public sector can no longer afford the 
"luxury" of dealing with each utility on an issue-by-issue basis. Like 
the utilities themselves, the public must now address the system consequences 
of individual decisions. The complicated, yet purposeful, organization 
of the region's utilities must be understood so that the implementation 
of public decisions is not constrained because of insensitivity to the 
people and organizations who must, in the end, provide for the electricity 
needs of the millions of families, businesses, and institutions in New 
England.
This is not meant to suggest that expanded public involvement in power 
management is unwarranted. Current public authorities over rate structures, 
facility siting, and environmental quality can, for example, significantly 
impact the region's electricity demand profile, the cost of generation and 
the price of delivered electricity, the financial capacity of the utilities, 
and the regional mix of generating capacity. Furthermore, increased public 
attention to energy conservation, fossil fuel acquisition, and new energy 
production technologies can profoundly influence the demand for electricity
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and the fuels available to power plants. Rather than relying on the 
utilities to sort out the systems consequences of this myriad of public 
actions, and rather than expecting the utilities to "second guess" 
tomorrow's public policy toward energy, it may be better to consider the 
possibility that public agencies, and the utilities should share responsibility
for the future of power generation, transmission, and pricing in New 
England.
As stated earlier, the thrust of the program strategy is to minimize 
the future cost of electricity and to shift fuel consumption by power 
plants away from oil. The program components--capacity planning, rate 
structures/load management, supplemental fuel, conversion to coal, and 
nuclear power— fall into two areas of public involvement in power manage­
ment. The first area is directed toward planning functions, and includes 
the capacity planning and rate structures/load management components of 
the program. The second area is directed toward the issue of power plant 
fuel mix.
Planning - NEPOOL currently projects that New England's generating capacity 
will need to be increased to over 35,000 megawatts by 1984 (in 1974, 
regional capacity was slightly over 19,500 megawatts). This represents 
almost 16,000 megawatts of capacity additions in ten years. Of these 
additions, all but a little over 5,000 megawatts have either been approved 
by NEP00L*s Board of Directors or have been publicly announced. Over 
65 percent of this new capacity is planned to be nuclear.
These capacity additions are justified by NEPOOL on the basis of 
forecasts of peak load requirements and necessary reserve margins. Similar
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forecasts by nonutility organizations, however, indicate that the capacity 
required for 1985 demands may be as low as 25,000 - 30,000 megawatts, 
depending on the success of regional energy conservation programs. Thus, 
whereas NEPOOL's planned reserve margin for the mid-1980's is between 
20 and 25 percent, it is possible that the actual margin (if all of the 
planned capacity is constructed) could range from 40 to 60 percent; and 
just as the region's current 45 percent reserve is costly to New England 
consumers, over-expansion of capacity will assure that New Englanders 
continue to pay for underutilized plant and equipment.
Events other than energy conservation, a levelling off of per capita 
consumption of electricity, and slower than anticipated growth in the 
population of the region can reduce generating capacity requirements.
Today, peak demands for electricity are about three times baseload demands. 
This situation can be changed by causing electricity demands to be more 
equally distributed over the demand period. Any permanent reduction in 
the ratio between peak and base load would be directly reflected in 
reduced capacity requirements.
Mitigating against the more conservative projections of electricity 
demand are those forces which may lead toward an increase in the per capita 
consumption of electricity. Not to be ignored are the effects which 
rapidly escalating prices and the threat of declining supplies of distil­
late oil and natural gas could have on future choices for space heating 
and (in some cases) for industrial process energy. If nuclear power does 
become the dominant source of electricity in New England, and if the cost
* Including the projections of electricity demand developed by ADL 
for NERC0M.
of nuclear plants and uranium fuel can be kept at levels which result in 
reductions in the delivered price of electricity, then it is conceivable 
that the demand for electricity could exceed even NEPOOL's projections. 
Furthermore, the interest of New England in accelerated industrial 
development, and the role which readily available power can plan in fac­
ilitating development, can influence attitudes towards needs for 
generating capacity.
The purpose here is not to suggest that the demand forecasts of 
NEPOOL, or ADL, or any other organization are right or wrong. That is 
not the issue. It is clear, however, that capacity planning lies at the 
heart of the power management problem in New England. It is also clear 
that capacity planning is intimately related to load management, to the 
structuring of electricity rates, and to externalities such as public 
actions on other energy fronts and the price and supply of energy forms 
which are substitutable for electricity (or, more generally, which are 
substitutable for electricity from traditional generation and distribution 
techniques). The real issues include:
. How can New England minimize the amount of generating capacity ' 
required to satisfy its electricity needs?
. What is the optimum use of electricity in New England, i.e., which 
uses should be encouraged and which should be discouraged?
. How can consumers be motivated to make efficient use of electricity?
. How can the utilities and the public sector work together to assure 
that the importance of these issues is reflected in the scope and 
quality of attention by both parties?
Defensible answers to these questions, and responsible actions to 
remedy the current problems inherent in planning New England's electricity 
future, can protect the region from exaggerated increases in the price of
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The thrust of the program strategy is to accomplish this through a 
cooperative public-private planning process. The paragraphs following, 
outline some mechanisms for accomplishing improved capacity planning 
and load management.
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A. The region can establish a regional organization that is 
COOPERATIVE authorized by the six New England states to develop with
REGIONWIDE
PLANNING the New England Power Pool (NEPOOL), and its various sub­
organizations and member utilities, a joint public-utility 
process for:
- Load forecasting and management;
- New capacity planning;
- Modernization of rate structures;
- Demand reduction.
This organization should not replace the resources of the 
various state public utility commissions; it should reinforce 
and complement them. It should be responsible for assuring 
that the states and the utilities move cooperatively toward 
a balanced system of power plants that produce sufficient 
electricity to meet New England's needs at the lowest possible 
cost to the consumer. This organization should also be respon­
sible for recommending how the impacts of electric power 
generation can be shared equitable within the region and 
among consuming sectors. Of particular importance are that:
(a) agreement be reached soon on the most appropriate basis 
for determining, and planning for, new capacity require­
ments through 1990; and (b) rate structures be designed 
which could encourage a reduction in peak loads.
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B. The states can adopt measures, individually or collec-
POWER PLANT
SITING tively, that will assure expeditious review, including adequate
public participation, and approval of applications 
for the location and construction of power plants.
Current review and approval procedures should be 
streamlined so that the time required for their 
completion be minimized. Past delays in site 
approvals should be analyzed to determine why the 
delays occurred and to define methods which could 
prevent recurring faults in the siting process.*
C. The region and its states should determine whether
NUCLEAR it is feasible, and whether it would be effective,
PERFORMANCE
GOALS to define a very specific set of performance ex­
pectations for nuclear power plants— including: 
plant reliability and safety; security of fuel 
supply, transportation, and storage; adequacy of 
radioactive waste disposal; and protection of the 
environment and public health from the risks of 
operating failures or anomalies. At the very least, 
these performance goals would express the expectations 
of the region's public leadership and responsible 
interest groups regarding nuclear power generation.
* A Federal Regional Council task force, led by FEA, has been addressing 
this problem.
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Fuel Mix - In 1974, approximately 70 percent of the input energy to New 
England's electric utilities was from residual oil. This represents 
about 90 percent of the fossil fuels used by the utilities, compared to 
the national average of about 20 percent. The heavy reliance of New 
England on residual oil for power plants has resulted in extremely high 
prices for electricity since the embargo of 1973-74. Boston consumers, 
for example, saw their electricity costs per killowatt-hour increase by 
over 55 percent in the two-year period ending in the summer of 1974.
The reasons for electric utilities to move toward a more balanced 
fuel mix are numerous. Residual oil is likely to continue for some time 
to be the most expensive of the fossil fuels. And because most of New 
England's residual oil comes from foreign sources, its supply security 
is uncertain. Thus, a switch away from oil may have beneficial price 
effects and may decrease the region's vulnerability to the risks of 
capricious actions by oil sources. Furthermore, a more diverse fuel mix 
would provide more flexibility to pick up the slack should one fuel become 
scarce, or to balance capacity utilization on the basis of cost to operate.
The alternatives for changing the power plant fuel mix are also 
numerous. In the near- to mid-term, the actions which will have the most 
significant impact are those which cause a shift from oil to coal and 
nuclear power. Unfortunately, both of these shifts are fraught with 
problems which are very difficult to deal with.
The shift to coal can occur in two ways: conversion of existing oil- 
fired facilities; and design of all new fossil fuel plants to burn coal 
instead of oil. In early 1974, it was estimated* that approximately 2500
These estimates are derived from the report by Ernst & Ernst to the Energy 
Program of the New England Regional Commission entitled "Feasibility of 
Short-Term Switching of Utilities from Burning Coal & Oil" (February 1974).
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megawatts of power generating capacity could be converted from oil to coal 
burning. This was 1n addition to the 342 megawatts which had already 
been converted In late 1973. These actual and potential conversions 
were estimated to save over 28 million barrels of residual oil annually, 
or about one third of the oil consumption by utilities In 1974.
The Implementation of these conversions to coal 1s not easily accom­
plished; nor Is It without cost. The most difficult problems to overcome 
are those associated with: (a) securing a long-term supply of low sulfur
coal at a reasonable price; and (b) transporting the coal to New England's 
utilities. The most significant cost to the region of conversion to coal 
1s the resultant Impact on air quality* Of the conversions noted above, 
only ten percent or so will not result In some deterioration 1n air quality.
Over 65 percent of the conversions could cause serious air pollution 
problems. However, even 1f the conversions which might cause serious 
deterioration 1n air quality are eliminated as possibilities, the savings 
1n residual oil would still be in excess of ten percent of the region's 
1974 consumption by power plants.
Between now and 1990, generating capacity In New England could exceed 
35,000 megawatts. NEPOOL's plan would result In additions of about 2,500 megawatts 
of fossil fuel-fired capacity, and over 10,000 megawatts of nuclear capacity.
If all of the new fossil fuel-fired capacity planned by NEPOOL were 
designed to b u m  coal rather than residual oil, the resultant 1990 balance 
between residual oil and coal for conventional thermal power plants would 
be approximately 80 percent oil and 20 percent coal. If environmentally
#
Conservation and load management measures could reduce this requirement 
to somewhere around 30,000 megawatts.
The 1974 balance was about 94 percent oil and 6 percent coal.
acceptable conversions of existing facilities are included, the percentages 
change to between 25 and 30 percent coal, and 70 to 75 percent oil. This 
level of coal consumption by New England's electric utilities would 
require over 10 million tons of coal per year, or roughly the same amount 
which came into the region in 1966.
The problems associated with the construction of this level of new 
coal-fired plants are similar to those which conversion programs are up 
against, i.e. acquisition of adequate coal supplies, transportation system 
inadequacies, and environmental consequences. The major difference is 
that the larger scale of coal-based operations means that many of the 
problems reach a level which makes them very difficult to handle. For 
example, whereas the utilities might be able to dispose of the bottom ash 
from the converted facilities in existing disposal areas, the incremental 
amounts of solid waste from the new facilities will require the acquisition 
of large tracts of land for the considerable additional ash and (possibly) 
sludges.
The other large scale alternative for balancing the power plant fuel
mix is to continue to add nuclear plants at a faster rate than fossil
plants. The arguments over nuclear power are well-known and will not be
repeated here. The question which must be answered by New England 1s
whether in the long term the risks of nuclear power generation are any
*
more or less significant than the risks of relying on coal or on oil.
* It is the opinion of the authors that this question has yet to be answered 
in a manner which makes it possible for public leaders to choose a course 
of action with confidence that it Is in the best interest of the region 
and other region's of the country. Furthermore, it does appear that these 
traditional options may each be unacceptable. This is one of the reasons 
for the main thrust of the overall program strategy, i.e. to use conserva­
tion as a method to minimize the necessity to choose from unacceptable 
alternatives.
It is undeniable that the region's current course toward nuclear 
power will cause a considerable shift in the power plant fuel mix. By 
1990, for example, the addition of about 10,000 megawatts of nuclear 
capacity would mean that about 40 percent of the region's capacity will 
be nuclear. In conjunction with a switch of fossil fuel plants to coal, 
the resultant distribution of power plant generating capacity could be:
. Nuclear ............. 40 percent (approximate)
.Oil  ......... 30 percent (approximate)
. Coal ................. 10 percent (approximate)
. Other* ............... 20 percent (approximate)
Also in the near- to mid-term is the opportunity to take advantage of 
New England's renewable resources for fuel supplements or for powering 
small-scale electricity generators. These opportunities are very attractive, 
but combined they do not offer anywhere near a baseload solution. They 
do, however, get New England started on a course which could have signifi­
cant long-term payoffs.
With commitments made now, in the long term New England could have the 
opportunity to derive most of its electricity from renewable resources.
To harness on a large scale the various forms of solar energy for electricity 
production within the next twenty-five years or so, however, requires that 
investments in appropriate technologies be accelerated from the current 
rate to one which better reflects the potential payoffs to New England and 
to the United States as a whole.
★
Other types of generating capacity include gas turbine, combined cycle, 
diesel, hydroelectric, pumped storage, and fuel cells.
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The most promising near-term opportunities are the utilization of 
solid waste as a source of boiler fuel, and the use of windmills for small- 
scale electricity generation. The use of refuse-derived fuel in utility 
boilers was first proven on a full-scale basis by Union Electric in St. 
Louis. Since then, other innovators have committed themselves to projects 
which are riskier than the St. Louis system (in which the refuse is used 
as a supplement to coal). The Bridgeport (Connecticut) project, for 
example, involves supplementing oil in the boilers of one of United 
Illuminating's plants.
As mentioned earlier, capture of the combustible fraction of the 
solid waste from New England's large metropolitan areas could result in 
a replacement of over 5 percent of the oil and coal which would otherwise 
be consumed by electric utilities. The region's utilities, however, are 
not in business to dispose of solid waste. They will need a reliable and 
consistent supply of refuse-derived fuel, and they will not be willing to 
jeopardize their operations should the fuel cause boiler problems. In 
addition, the utilities will most likely require that any of the incremental 
capital or operating costs caused by their use of the supplemental fuel s 
be paid for by the fuel supplier.
The use of windmills for small-scale generation of electricity is an 
example of an application of both new and old technologies in which one 
of the major unknowns is whether or not the utilities will help to deter­
mine the best way to interface the on-site system with their centralized 
systems. Although no reliable estimates of the supply potential from 
windmills exist, favorable wind conditions in New England and a growing 
technological capability to capture the wind energy point toward a rapidly
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evolving alternative to total dependence on a centralized system of power 
generation. Even some of the utilities appear to see possible marketing 
opportunities in small-scale systems.
The mechanisms which follow can be used to help the region strike a 
power plant fuel mix which is less oriented toward oil and which provides 
for a more manageable system of power generation.
A. New England must address the issue of the desired
OIL/COAL/NUCLEAR near- to mid-term power plant fuel mix. The utilities 
BALANCE
have made clear statements as to their intentions; the 
public debate has been confusing and often loaded with contra­
dictory statements. The region should define in as consistent 
and comprehensive manner as possible, the benefits, 
costs, and risks associated with large-scale oil, 
coal and nuclear power plants. These determinations 
could then be subjected to intensive public review 
and scrutiny so that judgmental values can be 
incorporated in the review, and so that the broadest 
possible base of technical expertise is brought to 
bear on the problem. The final results of this 
effort might then be the basis for a fuel mix plan 
which is arrived at through a regionwide negotiation 
between the public sector and the utilities.
B. The significant potential of refuse-derived fuel for
SUPPLEMENTAL supplementing oil or coal should be realized at the
FUEL FROM
SOLID WASTE earliest possible date. The utilities will not
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SUPPLEMENTAL 
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(continued)
subvert their responsibility to deliver electricity 
at low cost and with maximum reliability— and the 
burning of refuse-derived fuel could increase generating 
60sts or even cause significant boiler maintenance 
problems. One method for relieving the fuel suppliers 
(who frequently will be municipalities or state- 
sponsored authorities) from their liabilities for 
increased utility operating costs and even worse, 
from the risk that a utility might be forced by a 
PUC to discontinue use of the fuel due to increases 
in costs which cannot be transferred to the supplier, 
is to establish a liability trust fund which can 
act as insurance against such occurrences. The 
fund would be built from insurance premiums paid 
by the fuel suppliers (the premiums would have to be 
reasonable; the insurance period would have to be 
at least as long as the period required to retire 
the capital financing obligations of the supplier).
In return for protection against incremental 
operating costs, the utilities could be required 
to sign a long-term commitment to purchase the fuel 
on a price per Btu equivalency with their primary 
fuel.
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C. As part of an effort to encourage the utilization
SMALL-SCALE of small-scale on-site electricity generating systems
GENERATING
SYSTEMS that use renewable sources of energy, the states and
the region can work with the utilities to devise 
methods that make it possible for a utility to enter 
into buy-sell agreements with owners of the small- 
scale systems. This will cause a more efficient use 
of the decentralized systems and could, over time, 
lead to a reduced need for new centralized generating 
capacity.
D. New England should bring pressure on the federal govern­
ment, and particularly on the Energy Research and Develop­
ment Administration, to rationalize electric power-related
:deral
energy R&D expenditures so that investments in new tech­
nologies reflect at least six criteria: (a) the likely
supply potential of the technology; (b) the likely timing 
of the commercialization of the technology; (c) the fuel(s) 
that the resultant technology will replace and their 
expected future availability, price, etc.; (d) the social 
and environmental costs of the technology; (e) the econ­
omic impacts from commercialization of the technology; 
and (f) the net energy produced by the technology, i.e., 
net of extraction and conversion efficiencies, trans­
mission losses, and energy subsidies for the extraction 
distribution cycle. Developed in this multi-dimensional 
return on investment format, ERDA's investment profile
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would reflect a sensitivity of R&D to a broad range
FEDERALggn of needs. In addition, ERDA should be encouraged to
(continued) expand the importance of the unique needs and capabilities
of the regions to its resource allocation decisions.
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Energy Industry Development*
Energy, in much the same manner as other forms of infrastructure 
such as highways and sewer lines, is an input requirement, and deter­
minant of the development pattern, of the New England economy. Indeed, 
energy is the life blood of any developed economy. Thus, it is appro­
priate that the public sector guard the security of its energy supply 
and attempt to assure equitable energy costs. However, public energy 
programs also can be viewed as means for expanding private market oppor­
tunities, creating new enterprises, and providing job opportunities.
Energy is a manufactured product— the output of a number of different 
industries engaged in the chain from extraction of raw fuel sources 
(e.g., crude oil) through distribution. Industries involved in fuel ex­
traction and processing and in the production and distribution of usable 
energy are key to the economic development of the nation. These "energy" 
industries are important economic activities, per se, because:
. They provide jobs and income directly and indirectly through 
multiplier effects; and
. They have stimulated the development and growth of support 
industries (such as manufacturers of refinery and process con­
trol equipment), and derivative industries (such as plastics 
manufacturers).
Thus, from the primary energy industries have developed complexes of 
interrelated industries along the chain of extraction, processing, pro­
duction, and distribution of energy.
* This section is both based on, and contains paraphrases from, the 
Development Sciences Inc. report to the Energy Program of the New 
England Regional Conmission entitled "Decision Making for Energy 
Facilities in New England" (December 1975).
96
New England, lacking its own indigenous fossil fuel sources, has 
had a relatively small participation in the economic stimulus provided 
by the nation's development of traditional fossil fuels. It does some 
manufacturing of heavy turbines, process control systems, and--more 
recently--the construction of sophisticated and specialized LNG tanker^. 
It is also the location of important engineering services for the design 
and construction of refineries around the world. However, the region 
has not experienced the agglomeration of industrial complexes related to 
energy development which has occurred in energy resource-rich areas.
Even with OCS development and construction of a refinery or refineries 
In New England, it is unlikely that the manufacture of the sophisticated 
and specialized equipment components will take place here.
Despite all of this, New England should not dismiss the economic 
development potential provided by energy industries. Today, concern over 
dependency upon traditional fossil fuels is beginning to stimulate the 
development and growth of new energy industry complexes. These complexes 
will be based upon renewable energy resources, especially the many forms 
of solar energy, and upon recapturing energy embodied in discarded pro­
ducts of society— trash (solid waste), and wastes from various industrial 
processes. Development and growth of new energy industrial complexes 
involving new technologies and fuel sources provides New England with an 
opportunity to build a foundation for renewing a once flourishing economy. 
Involvement in the final stages of development of the domestic oil and 
gas industries gives che region entry into the energy market, and focuses 
energy industry attention on New England.
Only with the energy crisis created by OPEC actions has New England 
begun to become aware of the economic opportunities associated with energy
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developments. This has led toward a justifiable interest in the more 
glamorous new energy industries associated with renewable supplies and 
recovery from waste products and waste heat. While opportunities exist 
for New England to capture its "fair share" of the growth of the new 
energy industrial complex, it is in stiff competition with the energy 
rich producing states who already are jointly mobilizing to use their 
energy resources to further their economic development by further shaping 
national policy to their benefit.
The rewards may be substantial. Recent estimates indicate that by 
1985 solar heating and cooling systems will be a $1.3 billion annual 
market in the United States with an even greater potential during the 
last fifteen years of this century. Solar energy for the production of 
electricity, while further off than individual building heating and cooling 
systems, will start to become a burgeoning market during the latter part 
of this century. Related alternative energy technologies, such as wind­
mills, for electric power generation will also begin to come on-line 
during the next ten- to twenty-year period. NASA, for example, is building 
a windmill power plant in Sandusky, Ohio, and there is a proposal to build 
a 70 megawatt windmill generator on Cape Cod. Technologies for utilizing 
tidal change and thermal gradients may also become commercialized in the 
not too distant future.
Federal legislation promoting private demonstrations in alternative 
energy technologies and joint public-private ventures will contribute to 
the development and commercialization of alternative energy technologies. 
New England can capitalize on the economic development potential offered
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by the rapid growth of alternative energy technology, just as it did in 
the late 40's, 50's, and the early 60's in the electronic and computer 
fields.
Development, production, and servicing of alternative energy tech­
nologies could provide New England-based firms with a competitive edge 
in "Third World" trade. Many of these oil rich developing countries 
over the next 30 - 50 years will see their energy resources depleted. , 
To conserve this resource for the highest and best uses, such as fer­
tilizer production, they increasingly will need to turn to the use of 
alternative energy technologies to meet their internal energy require­
ments. Iran's recent efforts to obtain a large nuclear generating plant 
as part of a trade package with the United States is a foretaste of the 
international market for alternative energy technologies which can be 
expected to emerge. Alternative energy technologies may also be helpful 
in these countries' efforts to check the frightful and overwhelming 
growth of a few metropolises, and in achieving the objectives of their 
economic development plans. Gaining a competitive edge in alternative 
energy technologies,'thus, could open additional market opportunities 
for New England's "brain power" based economy.
If New England fails to move aggressively and rapidly into the 
alternative energy technology field, it may remain in the economic 
doldrums while other regions prosper from the national drive toward a 
restructuring of our energy production capabilities. The impact of this 
rapidly expanding field will not only be in manufacturing, but in the 
development of associated distribution and service systems and from 
construction activities associated with putting the alternative tech-
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oologies in place. Public actions which can accelerate utilization of 
alternative energy technologies in New England can:
- Provide a partial replacement for the declining momentum 
being experienced in communications equipment, electronic 
components, computers and other business equipment; and
- Provide some off-set to the market uncertainties facing 
the region's aerospace and shipbuilding industries.
The requirements for an effective New England energy industry de­
velopment program should Include capabilities to
- Create market opportunities for New England-based companies;
- Stimulate private capital investment in New England in new 
energy production facilities; and
- Stimulate the formation of new energy enterprises.
The central objective is to significantly increase opportunities for 
employment of New Englanders already in the labor force, or those young 
persons who will begin entering the labor force over the next fifteen 
years. The strategy is to provide development incentives which are 
sufficient for giving New England an "edge" in its attractiveness to 
promising new businesses, or to established companies which are expansion- 
minded. And, although the focus is on that segment of the energy industry 
which is still in its infancy, the program is intended to cover all forms 
of energy industry development.
As mentioned earlier, there are two major program components for 
energy industry development in New England. These program components 
involve public actions of:
- Direct public investments
- Incentives for energy industry development.
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In general, actions involving direct public investment have the objectives 
of fostering the creation of new enterprises in the energy technology 
field and of stimulating private investments in energy technology. The 
objective of actions associated with providing incentives for development 
is primarily to stimulate the formation of a large-scale New England based 
market for new energy technologies, and to create an investment environ­
ment which attracts capital into the region for large-scale energy facil- 
itites. Combinations of the program components are necessary if there is 
to be a significant contribution made to the job and energy needs of the 
region.
Direct Public Investment - Direct public investment primarily is a device 
to stimulate development and commercialization of a variety of alternative 
energy technologies. Such an approach accomplishes two objectives: 
acceleration of a switch from traditional oil consuming technologies 
(or from traditional sources of oil), hence a reduction in the region's 
dependence exclusively upon imported oil; and expansion in plant, equip­
ment, and employment as a result of private investment multiplier effects.
Several different types of actions by the states could be undertaken 
to encourage private investment into alternative energy technologies.
Such actions can range from joint venture corporations to site acquisi­
tion for an energy facility and related uses, to financial rewards to 
inventors, to underwriting pilot or full-scale demonstration projects, 
and to provision of venture capital to new enterprises.
Examples of what can be done by the public sector are outlined below. 
These examples generally fall into two categories: (1) direct stimulation
of private investment; and (2) formation of new enterprises in alternative
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energy technologies. Public underwriting of new enterprise formation 
presumes an increase in private investment as such enterprises begin 
to grow.
A. The states individually or collectively could 
follow the lead established by federal statue
JOINT VENTURE
CORPORATIONS (Sec. 7[b] of PL 93-577, Non-nuclear Energy Re­
search and Development Act of 1974) and establish 
joint state (regional) industry corporations.
Such corporations should specify the time interval 
of state participation— probably not less than 10 
years and not more than 15 years. Each such cor­
poration should be able to design, construct, 
operate and maintain one or more experimental, 
demonstration or commercial size facility in order 
to determine the technical, environmental, financial 
and market feasibility of a particular energy tech­
nology. Industry participants would be New England 
based firms. The extent of state financial partici­
pation should be determined in advance of the actual 
formation of a corporation. Criteria used to determine 
the extent of public participation might include:
- Technical and economic risk of the venture;
- Probability of a financial return to the venture which 
would permit reimbursement to the state to cover its 
principal and any interest costs incurred;
- Probability of financial return to private sector 
participants;
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JOINT VENTURE
CORPORATIONS
(continued)
- Financing capability of the potential private 
participants;
- Potential of the corporation's activities re­
sulting in substantial market and growth prospects 
beyond the time established for the duration of 
the joint venture corporation.
In agreeing to pubiic participation in such joint
ventures, it would be important that the state (reW
gion) not confine itself only to those situations
where it could reasonably expect a payback of its
investment. An important function of such joint
ventures is to stimulate the New England private
sector to undertake investments in high-risk areas
of energy technology that may have a long-term
promise of significant payoffs. The underlying
premise is that through such joint ventures, the
private sector would gain more quickly competitive
capability in a wide range of energy technologies
than if it had to rely solely on conventional means
of financing. Moreover, this capability could be
spread among both small and large firms (which is
unlikely in the absence of public assistance).
Public financial participation could be achieved 
through one of several different devices, depending 
upon the overall purpose of the corporation and the 
revenues expected:
- appropriation out of general revenues;
- issuance of industrial revenue bonds;
- levying of a very small energy research and develop­
ment tax on various categories of fossil fuel consumers.
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B. Energy facility site acquisition can expedite private
SITE ACQUISITION investments by guaranteeing that needed sites will be 
FOR
ENERGY FACILITIES available to private energy facility developers at 
reasonable costs when needed. Appropriately located 
and environmentally acceptable sites could be acquired 
for such energy facilities as power plants» refineries» 
shoreside terminals, manufacturing plants, wind power 
generating plants, etc. Depending upon the particular 
energy facility and arrangements made with private 
Industry, public acquisition of sites could include 
land for industrial parks or large-scale commercial 
or residential developments.
In order to develop an energy facility site acquisition 
program, it may be desirable that a revolving land 
acquisition fund be established. The states could 
create a special authority or public corporation 
responsible for the management of such a fund, or 
could assign the function to an existing agency. Be­
cause of the potential for Unking other types of de­
velopment such as an industrial park or large-scale 
residential complex to energy facility sites, con­
sideration should be given to creating a statewide 
organization, perhaps patterned somewhat along the 
lines of the Nashville Thermal Transfer Corporation in 
Tennessee, for supplying heating and cooling services 
from steam.
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C. In order to encourage developments 1n alternative 
energy technologies that would have widespread 
commercial application, the states could provide 
financial incentives in the form of grants or 
financial rewards to inventors or to a consortium 
of inventors. The term "inventors" could include 
an individual, a corporation, a university and 
other nonprofit entities. An important issue associ­
ated with such a financial incentive program would 
be the need to resolve patent rights 1n an equitable 
manner. If patents are to be only in the name of the 
state providing a grant, there is a potential danger 
that inventors would not make use of such a financial 
program for fear of losing substantial future income 
from royalties.
D. A demonstration program can accelerate the development
UNDERWRITING and commercialization of energy technologies developed
DEMONSTRATION
PROJECTS by New England-based firms. Pilot or full-scale dem­
onstration projects are often required to prove the 
technical and economic feasibility of a particular 
technology. Such demonstration projects also provide 
an invaluable marketing device by permitting the manu­
facturer to show prospective purchasers a "hands on" 
demonstration that the equipment (system) actually 
works. Financial encouragement of such demonstrations
FINANCIAL
INCENTIVES
TO
INVENTORS
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could make the New England states a "product con­
vention center" for the working display of its 
industries, products and capabilities.
Underwriting of pilot or full-scale demonstrations 
should be restricted to those situations where internal 
corporate funds are not sufficient to support such an 
activity, or where outside conventional sources of 
funds are not readily available. It can be expected 
that small and medium sized energy technology firms 
are most likely to be in need of such state demonstra­
tion grants.
Demonstration grants need not cover the full cost of 
design, engineering, and construction. Instead, grant 
assistance might be for planning, market research, or 
preliminary engi neering.
E. Some of the New England states as part of their tech­
nical assistance programs try to assist new entrepreneurs 
in securing venture capital through conventional sources. 
It might be desirable, however, to enlarge such activities 
by having available a state venture capital fund to 
finance high risk new energy enterprises. Such finan­
cing should not compete with more conventional sources 
of private financing. Rather, it should be made avail­
able only where private financing is not available at
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reasonable interest charges or terms and conditions. 
Alternatives to direct venture capital should also be 
considered, including loans, loan guarantees, and risk 
insurance.
Management of such a state venture capital fund will 
require special expertise in assessing the entrepre­
neurial drive of the applicant, the management and 
marketing know-how of the persons involved, the sales 
potential of the product, and various technical factors 
associated with the proposed product. In addition, 
there should be a follow-on management assistance 
program aimed at minimizing the mistakes often made 
by new enterprises during the first two years of 
operation. The expertise required to manage this kind 
of program can be in-house, but in order to obtain some 
of the highly specialized skills needed, considerations 
should be given to contracting with private organizations 
in New England who already have such capability.
Incentives for Development - Industrial development can be stimulated 
through methods which are less direct than public investment in risky 
ventures. One advantage of indirect methods such as tax incentives is 
that there is less chance that public intervention 1n private industry 
activities will lead toward complex private-public relationships which 
are difficult for both parties to manage consistently. A disadvantage 
of these less direct methods is that market response to them may develop
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slowly, and as a result certain opportunities may be lost.
The mechanisms listed below might be used as part of the program to 
cause energy industry development to occur in New England at a more 
rapid pace than might otherwise be expected.
A. Frequently, one of the constraining factors to 
various forms of energy industry development is the
SITE
PRE-DESIGNATION process of acquiring a site and receiving necessary 
approvals for its development. Short of site acqui­
sition, the states could designate certain areas 
which they deem suitable for specific types of energy 
facility development. The designation of suitability 
for specific forms of development could carry with it 
a streamlined process for state approval of the site 
once various permits are applied for. This does not 
mean that strict enforcement of state or local en­
vironmental or land-use controls should be foregone—  
the pre-designation process should be designed so as 
to avoid the misuse of land and other resources and 
to make the site approval process more a function of 
the quality of the design of the specific project 
than a decision on the ability of the site and its 
environs to carry the development.
B. Sometimes, tax laws can be the difference between a "go"
TAX
INCENTIVES and "no go" decision on an investment. Sometimes, the
promise of a tax break can swing the decision toward
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the investment. Otherwise, the threat of a (relative) 
tax penalty can prevent the investment. The states 
can use tax incentives to: (a) encourage businesses
to locate in New England; (b) encourage New England 
residents to invest in local businesses; (c) encourage 
households and businesses to upgrade heating systems, 
to invest in supplementary fuel Systems, or to improve 
their energy use practices; and (d) encourage New 
England businesses to invest in energy-related research 
and development. Tax credits, accelerated depreciation 
allowances, and delayed taxation are all mechanisms 
which can be used to provide incentives to citizens 
and businesses to act in concert with the general 
public purpose.
C. The public sector can create favorable market conditions
MARKET for the widespread commercialization of new energy tech-
AGGL0MERATI0N
nologies. For example, statewide building codes could 
be adopted requiring that certain new residential or 
commercial structures have solar water heating. (Such 
a requirement is mandatory in Australia.) At a 
mimimum, building codes (and, in some states, historic 
district building legislation) should permit use of 
solar and wind technologies.
The states could require that all new public buildings 
and buildings receiving state financial assistance
TAX
INCENTIVES
(continued)
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install heating and cooling systems that use either 
solar technology or solid waste as a fuel source. A 
similar requirement could be made where there is a 
major modernization of an existing public building.
The states could modify existing regulations and rate 
structures to encourage electric utilities to use wind 
technology and recovered fuel from solid wastes. Con­
sideration also could be given to permitting utilities 
to utilize surplus electric power generated by non­
utility sources. This consideration is complicated 
because of its effect on the rate structure, but 
should not be dismissed for that reason. Indeed, there 
are already instances where individuals using wind to 
produce their own electric energy needs are contribu­
ting their surplus production to a local utility 
system.
TECHNICAL
ASSISTANCE
D. Technical assistance can run the gamut from promotion 
of the use of new energy technologies and installation 
of insulation and storm windows to assistance to 
companies regarding improved methods of industrial 
processing including use of recovered fuel to site 
pre-designation for power plants, refineries, shoreside 
terminals, etc. to streamlined procedures for the pro­
cessing of applications for energy facility siting.
TECHNICAL
ASSISTANCE
(continued)
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The states can provide these various forms of 
technical assistance and thereby help achieve an 
economic environment which supports rather than 
opposes the efforts of industry to achieve its 
purpose.
I l l
Public sector Involvement in New England energy management has 
developed rapidly over the last few years. Each of the six states 
now has the foundation for a reasonably comprehensive capability to 
deal with the types of issues and challenges which have been raised 
by the foregoing program strategy. Each foundation is different-- 
reflecting a collage of needs and values, of problems and organiza­
tional styles, and of philosophies and drives which makes each state 
unique and yet viewed as a whole presents a picture in which dissonance 
improves quality. Each foundation can be improved, especially in order 
to assure that the many complex and interrelated challenges of system­
atic management of energy supply and demand are not lost because of 
interagency misinterpretations of roles and missions.* The key 
problem, however, is not with the individual states.
Many, 1f not most, of the region's energy problems are either 
multi-state in nature or are better dealt with by six states acting in 
concert rather than alone. The institutional problem in New England 
is that there does not exist a regional entity which has a long-term 
charge to address these many regional aspects of the energy problems of 
the several states. That the Energy Program of the New England Regional 
Commission has been so useful to the region and to each of the individual 
energy offices indicates that the need for a regional organization is 
both real and immediate.
INSTITUTIONAL STRATEGY
* The report by Development Sciences Inc. to the Energy Program of the 
New England Regional Commission entitled New England Energy Resource 
Management: Perspectives for Change develops a detailed analysis of
some of the energy-related decision processes for each of the six states. 
The report also recommends energy management functions which each state 
should be able to perform.
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The program strategy which has been recommended suggests that 
many functions could be performed at the regional level, and that 
those which should be performed at the state level are coordinated 
among the states and supported by an organization which can provide 
certain information and services more efficiently than can the 
individual states. If New England is to take up the challenge of 
shaping its energy future, then it must also put Into place the most 
effective institutional means for doing so. The time to foster energy 
regionalism is before New England once again gets forced piecemeal 
into a reaction rather than action mode. And that time is at hand.
A Regional Energy Council*
It is recommended that the six states acting collectively authorize 
the formation of a regional energy management organization called, for 
now, the Regional Energy Council. The Council should serve initially 
as an advisory body. Prior to its creation, however, a specific agree­
ment should be reached, and a conmitment made, to broaden the scope and 
authority of the Council through a formal regionwide compact which pro­
vides the Council with certain powers to act on behalf of the six states. 
These powers might include, for example, the authority to represent the 
states in those aspects of electric power management in which NEPOOL becomes 
involved. The Regional Energy Council would serve as an interstate 
clearing house and coordinator for energy resource management and 
facility siting. It would perform several key functions to supplement
* This discussion is both based on, and paraphrases, parts of the above­
noted report by Development Sciences Inc.
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the management efforts of the various state energy agencies, including:
- Determination of regional power needs, e.g.:
. Load forecasts 
. Capacity needs 
. Demand reduction 
. Rate structure changes
- Development of regional energy balance and fuel mix targets
- Development of energy use standards
- Delivery of energy research and development services
- Representation of the states' positions with agencies of the 
federal government and with private industry
- Resolution of energy-related conflicts among the states; and 
encouragement of joint solutions to common or related energy 
problems
- Delivery of technical assistance to New England organizations
- Liaison with other regional and international organizations, 
especially the New England Regional Commission, the New England 
River Basins Commission and the Canadian Provinces.
The Regional Energy Council membership could include one designated
member from each state energy agency or a governor appointee with the
overall intention of maintaining a multi-interest body. The Council
could meet regularly and on an ad-hoc basis, depending on need.
Briefly, it could address its functional responsibilities as 
follows. Direct and on-going communications with NEPOOL would be 
fostered in the area of power forecasts and facility needs. NEPOOL 
information would be integrated with information contributed by each 
state member. The compilation and coordination of state level energy 
balance and fuel mix information would provide the Council with a re­
gional basis for advising the individual states on energy resource
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management needs. State level energy use standards— space heating and 
cooling, building construction and lighting standards, load leveling 
techniques, etc., could be brought before the Council for evaluation 
in terms of regional compatibility. Appropriate recommendations for 
change would then be made to the states. The Council arrangement also 
provides a unique opportunity for the membership to exchange information 
on research and development proposals from the various states and, in 
conjunction with the governors and the regional agencies (NERCOM and 
NERBC), the Council could develop priorities for funding proposals 
related to new energy producing technologies for state and/or regional 
application (e.g., solar heating systems, windmill power generators, etc.). 
The Council could also provide a base for region-wide support of energy 
related R&D at the federal level.
The Regional Energy Council could serve as New England's Regional 
Task Force for evaluating the problems of onshore and offshore impacts 
of OCS development and for proposing solutions (see the conclusions of 
Chapter Two). The Council's multi-interest membership and supporting 
staff could work in concert with the two major regional agencies as 
well as with the individual state coastal zone management programs to 
contribute regional inputs as part of the Department of Interior's 
management program for this natural resource. Task Force responsibilities 
could include: the coordination of onshore environmental impact state­
ment requirements; advice to the states on the siting of petroleum 
facilities; and advice to DOI on equitable lease staging procedures in 
light of national policy, expected volumes, onshore impacts, fisheries 
and other competing uses— so that tract development can have the least
115
environmental impact on the individual states and the region. Further­
more, the Task Force could evaluate the precedent set by the Deepwater 
Port Act of 1974 concerning state level veto power over facilities in 
national waters.
To supplement the functions of the Regional Energy Council, 
especially in the area of advising on energy facility siting, it is 
proposed that the Council initiate the development of a regional Tech­
nical Advisory Board (TAB) to serve a major subordinate arm of the 
Counci 1.
The work of a regional board such as TAB could contribute to state 
related facility siting decisions; technical credibility would be gained 
by the Regional Energy Council as well. The TAB would draw upon the 
regional Council's information base as well as other sources to:
- Centralize and coordinate natural resource, social, 
economic and energy resource technical data of regional 
concern and provide technical staff to service state 
needs.
- Provide a rational and unbiased expert panel to review and 
evaluate energy facility site development proposals.
- Foster regional agreement on the suitability of proposals 
to provide credibility for state-level decisions.
- Minimize conflicts and reduce the possibility of court cases 
through an adequately publicized open decision process.
- Provide a forum for the unified representation of New England 
concerns on OCS development as well as an institutional body 
capable of evaluating the positive and negative consequences 
to the region of onshore OCS related support and production 
facilities.
- Support the efforts of the state public utility commissions.
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With the formation of NEPOOL, the electric power generation 
utilities have set a precedent, though limited, at the New England 
regional level concerning communications and coordination with respect 
to power plant needs and siting. Only utility members comprise the 
NEPOOL organization. The proposed TAB would include members with ex­
pertise in all major types of energy facilities (not only power plants) 
and with access to the kind of data required to evaluate the suitability 
of facilities.
The ingredients required to implement a TAB capable of providing 
the service functions listed above, and others, are currently available 
in the region— a large reservoir of technical people exists in the 
academic, business, and government sectors, and an appropriate reservoir 
of natural resource and social, economic and energy resource technical 
data is available at various agency levels. These reservoirs of people 
and information could be drawn upon to develop the TAB organization. 
Several federal, regional, and state institutions could contribute data 
in support of a proposed TAB effort.
In light of the potential positive and negative impacts and overall 
complexity of energy facility siting, the TAB should be characterized by 
an interdisciplinary membership capable of providing a credible and 
balanced perspective to the evaluation of facility siting proposals 
brought before it. It is suggested that the membership include repre­
sentation from the following disciplines: land use and urban development,
environmental conservation and protection, water pollution control, air 
pollution control, manufacturing, engineering, electric power industry, 
gas industry, and the petroleum industry. An initial eight-member panel 
is suggested with each New England state governor afforded one appointment
117
and one at-large appointment afforded to each of the major regional 
agencies--NERBC and NERCOM. A chairman should be selected by vote 
of the whole membership.
Administration of the Regional Energy Council
The Regional Energy Council membership should advertise for and 
select an appropriate executive director responsible for managing day- 
to-day activities of the Council and the TAB. The executive director 
would, in turn, be responsible for selecting an adequate staff to support 
overall Council activities. A staffing arrangement could involve the 
selection of a northern states technical director, southern states 
technical director, one specialist representing each of the six states, 
and some number of technical support staff members. Maximum use of ex­
isting state and/or regional personnel should be fostered and funded 
by the Council's budget, but these people would be on loan from other 
agencies to service Council needs. At least one staff member should be 
an attorney familiar with energy facility siting regulatory requirements 
and the social and economic issues implicit to facility siting.
For the present, it is recommended that the governors assign an 
existing regional body, such as the New England Regional Commission, as 
acting Regional Energy Council for a specified period of time. Each 
governor should appoint one representative (responsible for state energy 
policies/programs) to work with the Conmission during this interim period. 
At the end of the period, the Commission and appointees should present 
to the governors a detailed plan for forming the Council and for imple­
menting functions described herein. The plan should also include proposed 
legislative packages.
Several funding options could be pursued in support of the organi­
zational, operational and research activities of the Regional Energy 
Council. One option is that each state could levy a Btu tax or energy 
surtax assessment. Allotments prorated according to population could 
be made to the Council by each state, or a prorated formula could be 
based upon individual states' Btu or surtax assessments. To offset TAB 
administrative costs, a prescribed percent of a state's facility permit 
filing fee could be allocated. Another option could involve an equal 
yearly assessment against each New England state.
Supplemental financial and legislative support is conceivable through 
the auspices of several existing and pending federal grant programs. The 
Energy Research and Development Administration (ERDA), pursuant to the 
Energy Reorganization Act of 1974 (PL93-438) is authorized to initiate 
and maintain new energy research and development programs at federal and/ 
or non-federal levels and could serve as a funding source for 
Council activities. Several bills are currently under Congressional con­
sideration which would provide substantial financial and legislative 
support for both state and regional energy-resource management policies 
and programs. Several important sections are quoted in part below to 
provide a perspective on the intent of these proposed legislative packages 
. Outer Continental Shelf Management Act of 1975 (S.521); Regional 
Outer Continental Shelf Advisory Boards Section:
"The Governors of coastal States may establish regional 
Outer Continental Shelf Advisory boards for such regions and 
with such membership as they may determine after consultation 
with the Secretary of the Interior and the Secretary of 
Commerce."
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"If a regional advisory board or a Governor of a potentially 
affected coastal State makes specific recommendations to the 
Secretary regarding the size, timing, or location of a pro­
posed lease sale or on a proposed development and production 
plan, the Secretary shall accept such recommendations from 
the regional advisory board or Governor, unless he determines 
they are not consistent with national security or overriding 
national interests. If the Secretary finds that he cannot 
accept any such recommendations, he shall communicate, in 
writing, to the board or the Governor the reasons for rejection 
of such recommendations. The Secretary's determination 
pursuant to this subsection shall be final unless determined 
in a judicial review to be arbitrary, or capicious. Such 
review shall take place in the United States Court of Appeals 
for a circuit in which an affected coastal State is located.
The first sentence of this subsection shall not apply to the 
determination by the Secretary whether the proposed development 
and production plan insures a safe operation."
. Coastal Zone Management Act Amendments of 1975* (S.586) ; Interstate 
Coordination Grants to States Section:
"The States are encouraged to give high priority (1) to coordi­
nating State coastal zone planning, policies, and programs in 
contiguous interstate areas, and (2) to studying, planning, 
and/or implementing unified coastal zone policies in such areas. 
The States may conduct such coordination, study, planning, and 
implementation through interstate agreement or compacts. The 
Secretary (Commerce) is authorized to make annual grants to the 
coastal States, not to exceed 90 percent of the cost of such 
coordination, study, planning, or implementation, if the 
Secretary finds that each coastal State receiving a grant under 
this section will use such grants for purposes consistent with 
the provisions of sections 305 and 306 of this title."
"The consent of the Congress is hereby given to two or more States 
to negotiate and enter into agreements or compacts, not in con­
flict with any law or treaty of the United States, for (1) devel­
oping and administering coordinated coastal zone planning, 
policies, and programs, pursuant to sections 305 and 306 of this 
title, and (2) the establishment of such agencies, joint or 
otherwise, as the States may deem desirable for making effective 
such agreements and compacts. Such agreement or compact shall 
be binding and obligatory upon any State or party thereto without 
further approval by Congress."
* To amend the Coastal Zone Management Act of 1972 to authorize and 
assist the coastal states to study, plan for, manage, and control 
the impact of energy resource development and production which 
affects the coastal zone, and for other purposes.
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(Note that the Act recognizes that critical coastal problems are 
immediate and provides funds for groups of states wishing to establish 
informal interim planning and coordinating entities for their coastal 
zones. Interim interstate entities may also receive 90 percent federal 
funding, but the provision expires in five years— ample time to 
establish formal interstate compacts.)
Coastal Energy Facility Impact Program Section:
"The Secretary (Commerce) is authorized to make a grant to a 
coastal State, if he determines that such State's coastal zone 
has been, or is likely to be, impacted by the exploration for, 
or the development or production of, energy resources or by the 
location, construction, expansion, or operation of an energy 
facility. Such a grant shall be for the purposes of enabling 
such coastal State to study and plan for the economic, environ­
mental, and social consequences which are likely to result in 
such coastal zone from exploration for and development or pro­
duction of such energy resources or from the location, con­
struction, expansion, or operation of such an energy facility.
The amount of such a grant may equal up to 100 percent of the 
cost of such study and plan to the extent of available funds."
"A coastal State may, for the purpose of carrying out the pro­
visions of this section and with the approval of the Secretary, 
allocate all or a portion of any grant or loan received under 
this section to (1) a local government; (2) an areawide agency 
designated under section 204 of the Demonstration Cities and 
Metropolitan Development Act of 1966; (3) a regional agency; 
or (4) an interstate agency."
(Note a Coastal Energy Facility Impact Fund would be created. $200 
million annually for three fiscal years would be allocated to the fund—  
$50 million for grants and/or loans for preplanning and $150 million 
for impact funding.)
In addition to the above, other legislative and financial support
options could be proposed. However, the significant point is that a
number of legislative and funding opportunities exist, or are being
proposed, through which the Regional Energy Council's important review
and advisory functions could become a reality.
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KEEPING ON COURSE
New England's and the nation's energy problems will take a long 
time to solve. The difficulty in organizing a national energy policy, in 
spite of the 1973 embargo, indicates the massive complexities associ­
ated with development of a just and equitable posture that must reflect 
widely different values. For the foreseeable future, there will be 
disagreements, experimentation with an expectation of failure from time 
to time, and a great deal of activity. As energy resource problems 
intensify, governmental involvement at all levels will increase; a lack 
of national direction only complicates the ability of other jurisdictions 
to take sensible measures. Clearly the value differences that must be 
integrated argue against the likelihood of a consensus for large-scale 
measures that go in a single dominant direction.
As an importer of energy, New England has a position of extreme 
vulnerability. The region is not only vulnerable to supply, it is 
presently vulnerable to decisions made in other parts of the nation.
As those decisions must reflect values different than those in New 
England, the region stands to suffer because of ex-regional 
priorities.
New England, then, is in a precarious position unless or until the 
region can better manage its own energy situation. Clearly the "buy time" 
approach through conservation will increase regional energy security, 
but such an approach must reflect the desperate regional need to estab­
lish long-term economic viability. An energy policy is not an end
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in itself; it must be a means to other ends because 
it so fundamentally affects life styles. Here in New England energy 
policy must drive to economic rehabilitation through development of 
secure fuel sources and export markets. The concept of a creative New 
England renewing its economy needs to be implemented once again.
The region's policy must be flexible; experimentation and emerging 
new technologies argue against establishment of a rigid energy posture. 
It is precisely the emergence of new energy technologies and needs, 
however, that contain the elements of a regional energy posture, one 
that is built around flexibility and economic revitalization. In this 
regard the entire region can be considered as one unit, for the entire 
region must import energy and the entire region is suffering economic 
difficulties.
The entire region, then, must develop a necessary mutual thrust 
toward the future that emphasizes both energy and economic development. 
Regional coordination will allow for more secure development activity 
than the individual financially stressed states. There is no question 
that New England's energy actions will carry risk and costs that will 
be difficult to bear, but energy decision-making cannot be reduced to 
simple^answers that produce guaranteed results.
Throughout this document there have been challenges outlined 
that must be undertaken by a regional body. Although a comprehensive 
regional energy entity is difficult to establish at once it is neces­
sary to set a common course to achieve the long-term goals of regional 
energy development. Such a regional body would represent each member 
state as well as different individual interests. This council would
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serve the region as an information center and technical advisory board 
concerning all energy-related matters; it would aid the region in moving 
away from oil dependence while integrating new activities in an economic 
development framework.
The essential task of this body will be to establish a framework 
of energy policy coherence while taking advantage of the opportunities 
of the moment. The charter of the regional body will be to stress the 
long term, but individual activities will be incremental and will encour­
age others to take those small steps that over the long run travel large 
distances.
The present structure of energy-related planning is extremely 
complex, disaggregated, and yet interrelated. Such a regional body would 
serve as a central information base regarding OCS development, power 
generation, conservation, new energy industry development, and impact 
assessment. An adequate integrated energy information base will serve 
to facilitate the decision-making of individual states and state agen­
cies while ensuring that the overall goal of economic rehabilitation 
is met in a manner to achieve energy security. It would be through 
such a body that meetings are arranged with utilities, OCS developers, 
and federal representatives so as to increase communications and an 
understanding of the issues involved.
The establishment of yet another institution in addition to 
existing institutions carries risks in terms of cost, authority, and 
ability to adequately function, but the region's energy posture argues 
strongly for a coordinating mechanism among individual states of some
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kind. If each state within the region agrees that the major energy 
issues facing New England are faced in common, and if each state within 
the region chooses a complementary development policy, then a regional 
body will operate efficiently by expressing the collective views of 
each member state. And whereas national values are widely different and 
often competitive, the essential values required in New England are held 
in common.
A regional posture that drives toward establishment of an alterna­
tive energy infrastructure (including best use of fossil fuels over the 
transition period) presents the region with an opportunity to create 
an economic position of strength. The region does not have available 
enough resources to compete with traditional energy sectors, and as 
these sectors are based on limited resources, their long-term future 
is in question. Given that liquid fossel fuel resources will substan­
tially diminish over the next thirty years, a regional position to 
establish an alternative energy infrastructure is critical. Keeping on 
course requires that we move consistently away from oil, toward coal, 
some nuclear and ultimately to renewable energy sources. The regional 
institution has as its primary mandate to keep the direction of 
change in focus, and the timing economic.
It may be an ironic circumstance that presents New England with 
an admittedly risky but assured potential. Whereas for generations 
the region has watched local citizens and technologies and industries 
disappear to energy-rich areas of the nation, the region now should 
focus on its prime resource, the resource the region has always
125
produced, that may in the end become most important - Yankee ingenuity. 
When energy was plentiful and cheap, the limitations of New England 
supply caused economic havoc, for energy was more plentiful and cheaper 
elsewhere. Today, however, it is incumbent to utilize advanced tech­
nology in relation to ancient energy sources, because as that cheap 
and plentiful energy begins to grow scarce there will remain only untapped 
and ancient energy potentials to rescue a society that is committed to 
fossil fuels.
New England has that resource as well as the motivation to utilize 
that resource in a most productive manner by tying its development 
to employment and the efficiency of small independent systems. And it 
is here, based on the energy value of maximum self-sufficiency, that 
the New England traditions of home rule and "savvy" come into play, 
for their development and expression not only provide a long-term energy 
policy, they provide for economic renewal as well.
It is this thrust that the strategies described in the previous 
section strive to achieve. It is only this thrust that accepts ex- 
regional limitations and utilizes to maximum benefits those resources 
that the region does have. This is also a general thrust, extremely 
long-term while addressing short-term needs, providing the states with 
an ability to "zig-zag" their way to a stated goal while allowing for 
technological change and minimizing the region's precarious position 
with respect to traditional energy supplies. As outlined in detail, the 
region must extend the provision of traditional energy supplies while 
embarking on a program to become independent of them, to develop a 
regional export base, and to develop a way of life that accepts the 
reality of non-renewable resources.
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